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Abstract—Integer overflows in commodity software are a main
source for software bugs, which can result in exploitable memory
corruption vulnerabilities and may eventually contribute to pow-
erful software based exploits, i.e., code reuse attacks (CRAs). In
this paper, we present INTGUARD, a symbolic execution based
tool that can repair integer overflows with high-quality source
code repairs. Specifically, given the source code of a program,
INTGUARD first discovers the location of an integer overflow
error by using static source code analysis and satisfiability modulo
theories (SMT) solving. INTGUARD then generates integer multi-
precision code repairs based on modular manipulation of SMT
constraints as well as an extensible set of customizable code repair
patterns. We evaluated INTGUARD with 2052 C programs (≈1
Mil. LOC) available in the currently largest open-source test suite
for C/C++ programs and with a benchmark containing large and
complex programs. The evaluation results show that INTGUARD
can precisely (i.e., no false positives are accidentally repaired),
with low computational and runtime overhead repair programs
with very small binary and source code blow-up. In a controlled
experiment, we show that INTGUARD is more time-effective and
achieves a higher repair success rate than manually generated
code repairs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Integer overflows are challenging to repair and thus result-
ing memory corruptions are hard to avoid for at least four
main reasons. First, integer overflows are of several types [3]:
overflow [12], underflow [13], signedness [17], truncation [19],
and illegal uses of shift operations. Second, integer overflows
are typically exploited indirectly [3], through stack or heap
overflows, which can lead to buffer overflows. In contrast,
buffer overflows can be exploited directly or indirectly. Typical
integer related vulnerabilities (see Figure 1 for more details)
lead to the following exploit types: Denial of Service (DoS),
arbitrary code execution, bypass of an upper bound sanitization
check, logic error, and array index attacks caused by a vulner-
able integer value. Third, integer overflows are hard to detect
as these vulnerabilities can reside deep in the program, and
manifest only for certain input types. Finally, required integer
overflow repair guarantees are hard to achieve. Reasons include
that: the location where the generated integer overflow repair
should be inserted is hard to determine; generating the right
repair format such that the repair is compilable, syntactically
correct and does not change the program intended behavior is
not trivial; the overhead introduced by a repair is quite high
if inserted naïvely in all locations prone to integer overflow
(particularly in hot code such as loops); deciding if an integer
overflow was correctly removed after inserting a repair is
not well addressed; determining whether an integer overflow
manifests itself across multiple integer precisions is not trivial;
and assessing if the integer overflow is intended or unintended
is difficult to decide and less researched.
Recent solutions can be used to repair the integer over-
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Fig. 1: Integer related vulnerabilities reported by U.S. NIST.
flows statically in order to avoid them during runtime. For
example, Sift [35], TAP [56], SoupInt [63], AIC/CIT [74], and
CIntFix [11] rely on a variety of techniques depicted in detail
in Table IV. In addition, several commercial tools [20] such
as Coverity Static Analysis, CodeSonar, Klocwork Insight,
Polyspace, and Infer are available. However, since information
about the detailed internals are mostly not public, we do not
focus on these approaches in our work. Importantly, from
the non-commercial tools only TAP first detects the integer
overflow and then attempts to remove it by repairing it. Thus,
the other tools may insert repairs that were not first categorized
as genuine integer overflows, or not propose repairs at all and
as a consequence may change the intended program behavior.
Further main challenges hindering wide adoption of these tools
are their low precision w.r.t. true positive detection, their high
runtime performance overhead (i.e., mostly the runtime based
tools) and that the generated repairs provide only few to no
repair guarantees. Thus, these repairs have to be considered
unsafe and of questionable value.
Sift [35]—to the best of our knowledge the only currently
sound program repair tool—is a static input filter generation
tool that inserts input filters in the program binary for which
the source code was previously manually annotated with source
code annotations. While making a substantial contribution to
the field, this tool has several limitations confirmed by the
authors (of which we list eight): it relies on user source
code annotations that are not always available for a source
code program or require a considerable annotation overhead
(e.g., annotating large code bases), upper bound source code
annotations for loops are needed when the analyzed expression
depends on a number of values that is not finite, not all
types of integer overflow relevant sites are supported (i.e.,
only memory allocations and block memory copy sites), for
some types of applications (i.e., web servers, etc.) with no
available input format specification (i.e., no image or video
files) Sift cannot be applied, the tool cannot guarantee that no
unwanted program behavior is introduced since the filters may
remove any integer overflow - even intended ones, does not
support multi-precision integer overflow repairs, annotated stub
standard C library functions need to be provided upfront for
functions that influence the computed symbolic condition (if
not provided, the filter will not be generated), and finally, the
tool cannot help to avoid integer underflows even though it is
straightforward to extend the algorithm to consider underflows
as well.
In this paper, we introduce INTGUARD, an automated tool
for the generation of useful and high-quality integer overflow
repairs for C source code programs. INTGUARD is non-
intrusive and generates multi-precision sound integer overflow
repairs and is intended to be used by programmers throughout
their daily routine [46]. Further, programmers should serve
as the final link in the repair insertion decision chain in
order to account for very cautious vendors [5], which allow
a code patch to be applied only after a thorough review.
INTGUARD is based on a conservative novel technique for
automated generation of repairs for C source code relying on
satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) constraint solving. Note
that INTGUARDs goal is not to classify integer overflows,
which can result in a memory corruption (e.g., if it is used to
determine the size of a heap-buffer). Instead, INTGUARD can
determine if an integer overflow is exploitable by performing a
data flow analysis between a certain program source (i.e., user
input) and a program sink (i.e., the source code location where
the bug manifests). Our novel technique relies on several build-
ing blocks. First, we apply static symbolic intra-procedural
and context-sensitive source code analysis for error detection
and repair. Second, we propose a novel automated C source
code repair generation algorithm based on SMT solving and
code repair stubs. More precisely, our integer overflow repair
generation technique is based on modular manipulation of
SMT constraints based on deletion and insertion of new SMT
constraints with the goal of generating new SMT constraint
systems used for assessing if the generated repair satisfies some
of the imposed repair requirements. And finally, we develop
a semi-automatic repair insertion technique, which satisfies
our previously mentioned repair requirements (e.g., preserve
correct program behavior).
The soundness definition we employ in this paper is as
follows. The automatically generated code repairs are not
program input dependent (i.e., SMT constraints and the Z3 [22]
solver are used). The underlying integer overflow detection
checker generates no false positives (i.e., every detected integer
overflow is a genuine integer overflow, each program loop is
unrolled up to 15 times, this value is customizable). A program
repair removes a previously detected integer overflow on all
program execution paths, which reach the integer overflow
location, without inserting unwanted program behavior (i.e.,
only the integer overflow is removed).
Next to sound repairs, INTGUARD fulfills the following two
important objectives. First, INTGUARD addresses four listed
limitations of Sift: no source code annotations are needed,
it can be applied to all types of C/C++ source code based
programs, the tool provides support for multi-precision repairs
(i.e., five types of multi-precision repair types are supported),
and the repairs can be used to avoid integer underflows as
well. Second, the generated repairs are syntactically correct
(and thus compilable, checked by code recompilation), and do
not crash the program after insertion (i.e., do not introduce any
unwanted program behavior). Finally, INTGUARD checks for
at least 54 types of integer overflows (see NSA’s Juliet [41]
test suite). Importantly, while repairs are generated fully auto-
matically in an efficient fashion, the repair insertion supports a
human-in-the-loop approach, but can also be fully automated,
if required. To the best of our knowledge, there are currently
no other techniques for repairing integer overflows in C source
code, which satisfy all above stated guarantees, and as such our
technique improves the state-of-the-art by statically inferring
sound integer overflow repairs. Furthermore, we provide the
first static symbolic execution based technique for automatic
generation of C source code repairs. Similar to our work, [40]
use a symbolic execution based technique to repair buffer
overflows in C source code.
In our evaluation, we analyzed 2052 C programs repre-
senting ≈1 Mil. LOC and have shown that INTGUARD repairs
more programs on the same test suite across multiple integer
precisions than CIntFix [11], while inducing only around
1% computational overhead and (≤2%) runtime performance
overhead, respectively. Note that CIntFix and AIC/CIT [74]
induced 16% and above 30%, runtime overhead, respectively.
The program binary and source code blow-ups of the repaired
programs are insignificant (≤1%). Further, we construct a
mini-benchmark to assess the precision and efficiency of our
tool w.r.t. large and complex programs. In the evaluation, we
showed that INTGUARD scales to large programs and that
our tool is efficient w.r.t. bug detection and repair generation.
In contrast, to other similar tools which only aim to achieve
scalability w.r.t. large programs we also search to detect and
repair large programs in a systematic way (i.e., we conduct
benchmark experiments to contrast and compare false positive
and true positive rates on large software). We further present
several in-the-wild integer overflow types that can potentially
be avoided if INTGUARD is used throughout programmers’
daily routines. Taken together, these contributions qualify
INTGUARD for real-world applicability.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We designed a novel sound integer overflow C source code
repair generation technique.
• We implemented INTGUARD, a tool usable for detection1
and repair2 of integer overflows.
• We provided an open-source repair tool that can be used to
repair integer overflows across multiple integer precisions.
• We experimentally demonstrated that INTGUARD is superior
to other state-of-the-art integer overflow repair tools.
• We evaluated INTGUARD thoroughly and show that it scales
to large programs and its repairs are useful.
• We experimentally showed that INTGUARD is more time-
effective than manual repair generation and insertion.
• We responded in our evaluation to the call for more qualita-
tive oriented measurements (see metrics and measurements
section in [65]) rather than mostly quantitative assessments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
§II we present a motivating example, and in §III we give the
1Demo movie integer overflow detection. https://goo.gl/uNvdRp
2Demo movie integer overflow repair. https://goo.gl/912Jux
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technical background need to understand the rest of this paper,
while in §IV we present the design of INTGUARD. In §V we
highlight brief implementation details, and in §VI we evaluate
INTGUARD, while in §VII we compare INTGUARD with other
tools and discuss its limitations. In §VIII we introduce the
the related work, and in §IX we give some future research
directions. Finally, in §X we conclude this paper.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In the following, we briefly preview our working example
to demonstrate automatically generated repairs. Consider for
this purpose the code snippet depicted in Figure 2. This code
snippet was extracted from a larger program contained in [41].
Within this code example we assume that the value returned
by the function deepNestedStructVar() and assigned
to the variable data is larger than 4294967295. Next, by
multiplication of the variable data with itself (see code line
8), an integer overflow will be generated at program line
number 8, since the variable in which the result of the multi-
plication result cannot hold the result of the multiplication.
snippet was extracted from a larger program contained in [31].
Within this code example we assume that the value returned
by the function deepNestedStructVar() and assigned to
the variable data is larger than 4294967295. Next, by mul-
tiplication of the variable data with itself (see code line 8),
an integer overflow will be generated at program line number
8, since the variable in which the result of the multiplication
result cannot hold the result of the multiplication.
Fig. 2: Integer overflow repair.
1 ...
2 data=deepNestedStructVar();
3 if(sqrt(result) <=
4 sqrt(4294967295)
5 && sqrt(result) >=
6 -sqrt(4294967295)){
7 unsigned int result;
8 result = data * data;
9 } else {
10 FILE *fp=fopen("IO_logg.txt",
11 "w+");
12 fprintf(fp,"FileName:%s
13 IO_ID:%s
14 Line:%d",
15 "base64.c",
16 "73656",
17 5);
18 fclose(fp);
19 }
20 ...
This is the case
because the variable
result is of type
unsigned int and
this variable can not can
store variables which are
larger than 4294967295.
The integer overflow at
line number 8 can be
avoided by inserting the
gray shaded code, which
we assume that during
the integer overflow
manifestation was not
present in the code
snippet. Note, that the
sqrt() operation accepts also variables having double
type and when a long is converted to a double we can
have precision lost. However, for this example we consider
that sqrt() accepts only integer parameters types.
III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In the following, we discuss canonical repair generation
strategies, and highlight relative advantages and disadvantages.
1) Manual Based Input Validation: Manually written input
validation checks for repairing integer overflows are chal-
lenging. First, they are error-prone and can take a significant
amount of time to be inserted in large code bases. Second,
they cannot guarantee that the integer overflow bug was really
removed for non-trivial code locations (i.e., multi-dependent
control flow based source code locations). Finally, they are
typically not applicable across multiple integer precisions, and
cannot guarantee that the intended behavior of the program is
preserved.
Further, there are multiple documented situations where an
integer overflow bug was only solved after a cascading array of
repairs that missed their intended goal several times. We dub
this type of trail of repairs as trial-and-error-repairs. Until a
repair finally succeeds, the intermediate (failed) attempts may
be particular dangerous if the programmer relaxes due to a
sense of false security. The main disadvantage of such repairs
is that it gives the impression the wrong impression that the
bug was removed. when in reality it was not.
2) Compiler Based Input Validation: Compiler based input
validation checks are cheap, and fast to insert, but can be opti-
mized away by some compilers. For example, when employing
the GCC compiler some input validation checks are useless
because these can be optimized away during compilation
since the C++ standard N4296 [55] specifies that integer,
arithmetic and signed overflows are considered undefined
behavior, and thus implementation specific. Furthermore, the
GCC developers believe that the programmers should detect
the overflow before an overflow is going to happen rather
than using the overflowed result to check the existence of
the overflow during runtime (see detailed discussion [26, 18]).
First, in some situations this is impossible, since the search
space for program inputs that trigger an integer overflow is
infinite. Second, as a consequence of compiler implementation
specifics, some checking conditions may be removed totally,
when the program is compiled with GCC in combination with
specific optimization options.
It follows that compiler based repairs do not guarantee that
the repair really removed the bug. They are also not applicable
across multiple integer precisions and do not guarantee that
no unwanted behavior is introduced. In contrast, compiler
based runtime checks have in general access to more specific
information than static tools and in some scenarios this access
can provide considerable benefits w.r.t. bug prevention.
Finally, we believe that stand-alone compilers should not
be the only tool to be used for repairing integer overflows
during compile time. Instead, specialized tools can provide
more guarantees and efficiency.
3) Symbolic Execution Based Input Validation: Symbolic
execution based techniques can be used to achieve more (if
not most aforementioned) repair guarantees. Furthermore, the
repairs are cheap to construct and to insert. However, these
techniques are based on computationally intensive analysis
strategies, which if not applied in an appropriate manner, may
not scale well (or at all) with large programs. We believe
that these repair tools are particularly suitable, if used early-
on during development by programmers, since the level of
software complexity is still low.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
In the following, we show in §IV-A the system overview of
INTGUARD by reviewing its main components, and in §IV-B
we depict the main features of our symbolic execution engine.
In §IV-C, we introduce the preconditions used by INTGUARD.
Next, in §IV-D we present the overall repair generation process
based on our novel technique, and in §IV-E we describe how
INTGUARD can be used to find repair locations in programs,
while in §IV-G) we discuss how repairs can be generated based
on test cases. Finally, in §IV-F we highlight how INTGUARD
can be used to efficiently insert code repairs into programs.
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Fig. 2: Integer overflow repair.
This is the case because
the variable result is of
type unsigned int and
this variable can not can
store variables which are
larger than 4294967295.
The integer overflow at
line number 8 can be
avoided by inserting the
gray shaded code, which
we assume that during the
integer overflow manifes-
tation was not present in
the code snippet. Note,
that the sqrt() operation
accepts also variables hav-
ing double type and when a long is converted to a double
we can have precision lost. However, for this example we
consider that sqrt() accepts only integer parameters types.
III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
This section provides the necessary background in order to
understand the rest of this paper. We start in §III-A by present-
ing the characteristics of integer overflows, and in §III-B we
briefly list several integer related problems, while in §III-C
we present why it is important to avoid integer overflows.
Finally, in §III-D we highlight how integer overflows can be
repaired, and in §III-E we describe how integer overflows can
be detected.
A. Characteristics of Integer Overflows
Integer overflows can be classified as: (1) intentional or
unintentional, and (2) malicious or benign. An integer overflow
manifests when the program gets some user-supplied input and
next the input value is used in an arithmetic operation to trigger
an integer overflow. Finally, a smaller than expected value
is supplied to the memory allocation function and as result
a smaller than expected memory will be allocated. Deciding
between the types of integer overflow related problems is rather
difficult and a lot of research has been invested in the last
years into this classification. A reason for this categorization
effort is the desire to be able to differentiate between hard
to find integer overflow errors that are more or less prone to
exploitability w.r.t. the effort that has to be invested in order
to find and repair them.
B. Integer Overflow Related Problems
There are several integer overflow related problems which
we will next list and briefly describe. CWE-191, integer un-
derflow (wrap or wrap-around) [13], the result of multiplying
two values with each other is less than the minimum admissible
integer value due to the fact that the product subtracts one value
from another. CWE-192, integer coercion error [14], manifests
during bad type casting, extension or truncation of primitive
data types. CWE-193, off-by-one error [15], during product
calculation/usage an incorrect maximum/minimum value is
used which is 1 more, or 1 less, than the correct value. CWE-
194, unexpected sign extension [16], an operation performed
on a number can cause that it ill be sign extended when it is
transformed into a larger data type. CWE-195, signed to un-
signed conversion error [17], a signed primitive is used inside a
cast to an unsigned primitive can produce an unexpected result
if the value of the signed primitive can not be represented
using an unsigned primitive. CWE-196, unsigned to signed
conversion error [18], an unsigned is used inside a cast to a
signed primitive, which can produce an unexpected value if the
result of the unsigned primitive can not be represented using
a signed primitive. CWE-197, numeric truncation error [19],
manifests when a primitive is casted to a primitive of a smaller
size and data is lost in the conversion. CWE-680, integer
overflow to buffer overflow [21], manifests when an integer
overflow occurs that causes less memory to be allocated than
expected, which can lead to a buffer overflow.
C. Avoiding Integer Overflows
It is important to avoid integer overflow based memory cor-
ruptions since these are insidious, costly, and exploitable. The
exploitability of integer overflow based memory corruptions is
a well understood topic and for this reason not very difficult
to be performed by a skilled attacker, for programs written in
C/C++ since these programing languages are notoriously prone
to integer overflow bugs. Code containing such a memory
corruption has a huge attack surface which can even be
exploited through the network by attackers in order to perform
CRAs ensuing serious consequences for all systems running
that particular source code version. Open source code can be
studied by attackers and new integer overflow bugs can be
detected with relative low effort and even without tool support.
Zero-day integer overflow bugs in open source software have
disastrous consequences since these are easily exploitable and
huge benefits gains can be achieved by the attackers. Finally,
integer overflow based vulnerabilities are traded online, as
pointed out by Snowden3 and others, and attackers can buy
integer overflow based vulnerabilities for a fraction of the
potential damage or the achievable attacker benefit. As a matter
of fact, we believe that, for these reasons and others not
mentioned here for brevity, software should be kept as clean
as possible from integer overflow bugs.
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden
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D. Repairing Integer Overflows
In the following, we discuss canonical repair generation
strategies, and highlight relative advantages and disadvantages.
1) Manual-Based Input Validation: Manually written input
validation checks for repairing integer overflows are chal-
lenging. First, they are error-prone and can take a significant
amount of time to be inserted in large code bases. Second,
they cannot guarantee that the integer overflow bug was really
removed for non-trivial code locations (i.e., multi-dependent
control flow based source code locations). Finally, they are
typically not applicable across multiple integer precisions, and
cannot guarantee that the intended behavior of the program is
preserved.
Further, there are multiple documented situations where an
integer overflow bug was only solved after a cascading array of
repairs that missed their intended goal several times. We dub
this type of trail of repairs as trial-and-error-repairs. Until a
repair finally succeeds, the intermediate (failed) attempts may
be particularly dangerous if the programmer relaxes due to a
sense of false security. The main disadvantage of such repairs
is that it gives the the wrong impression that the bug was
removed, when in reality it was not.
2) Compiler-Based Input Validation: Compiler based input
validation checks are cheap, and fast to insert, but can be opti-
mized away by some compilers. For example, when employing
the GCC compiler some input validation checks are useless
because these can be optimized away during compilation
since the C++ standard N4296 [67] specifies that integer,
arithmetic and signed overflows are considered undefined
behavior, and thus implementation specific. Furthermore, the
GCC developers believe that the programmers should detect
the overflow before an overflow is going to happen rather
than using the overflowed result to check the existence of
the overflow during runtime (see detailed discussion [33, 24]).
First, in some situations this is impossible, since the search
space for program inputs that trigger an integer overflow is
infinite. Second, as a consequence of compiler implementation
specifics, some checking conditions may be removed totally,
when the program is compiled with GCC in combination with
specific optimization options. It follows that compiler based
repairs do not guarantee that the repair really removed the bug.
They are also not applicable across multiple integer precisions
and do not guarantee that no unwanted behavior is introduced.
In contrast, compiler based runtime checks have in general
access to more specific information than static tools and in
some scenarios this access can provide considerable benefits
w.r.t. bug prevention. Finally, we believe that stand-alone
compilers should not be the only tool to be used for repairing
integer overflows during compile time. Instead, specialized
tools can provide more guarantees and efficiency.
3) Symbolic Execution-Based Input Validation: Symbolic
execution-based techniques can be used to achieve more (if
not most aforementioned) repair guarantees. Furthermore, the
repairs are cheap to construct and to insert. However, these
techniques are based on computationally intensive analysis
strategies, which if not applied in an appropriate manner, may
not scale well (or at all) with large programs. We believe
that these repair tools are particularly suitable, if used early-
on during development by programmers, since the level of
software complexity is still low. Finally, we believe that: (1)
manually written source code repairs should be avoided and
only used in easy to address situations, (2) compilers should
not be used for repairing integer overflows since the number
of guarantees which these can offer is low, and (3) specialized
tools which provide more guarantees should be used for repair
generation.
E. Detecting Integer Overflows
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Fig. 3: Path & state coverage vs. static & dynamic techniques.
Figure 3 depicts the code coverage (i.e., program path
coverage) and state coverage (i.e., symbolic variable coverage)
w.r.t. the most used analysis techniques to address the detection
of integer overflow bugs. As far as we are aware of there is
no technique which can be used for solving the problem of
integer overflow detection. Several techniques have emerged
over time with more or less applicability depending on the
concrete scenario in which they are applied. We do not intend
to review the advantages and disadvantages of these techniques
w.r.t. to each other but rather briefly stress why we decided
to use static symbolic execution for generation of our code
repairs and briefly highlight its advantages. Consequently, there
are several techniques which can be used to detect and repair
integer overflow with more or less success. These techniques
can be briefly compared against each other w.r.t. to program
path coverage and state coverage. We decided to use these
dimensions, depicted in Figure 3, since they make the most
sense for our goals mentioned in the Section I. In order to
achieve these goals we want to have high path coverage and
state coverage in order to have sound code repairs w.r.t. the
fact that these should not change program behavior and integer
overflow bugs should be correctly removed after applying
the code repair. For this reason we opted for static symbolic
analysis which achieves higher path coverage than concolic or
purely static analysis techniques by visiting program paths in a
depth-first search (DFS) fashion. Our static analysis technique
benefits from the possibility of parallel execution which can
be effectively used to speed up the analysis and thus more
paths can be visited and simultaneously more states can be
analyzed than in single threaded scenarios. For this purpose,
we currently use a DFS strategy of path traversal which helps
to perform a more informed search space traversal than without
this technique. We plan to implement other techniques in the
future. We currently perform path pruning by merging paths
based on dead variables and checking satifiability of paths at
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branch nodes. This helps to drastically reduce uninteresting
paths and also reduce search locations. Additionally, we check
only at interesting locations (e.g., assignments) in the source
code for integer overflow bugs and thus we further reduce the
possible search space. Techniques such as fuzzing and inter-
polation have high priority targets on our future work agenda
and we think that these can be implemented in INTGUARD
with ease.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
In the following, we show in §IV-A the system overview of
INTGUARD by reviewing its main components, and in §IV-B
we depict the main features of our symbolic execution engine.
In §IV-C, we introduce the preconditions used by INTGUARD.
Next, in §IV-D we present the overall repair generation process
based on our novel technique, and in §IV-E we describe how
INTGUARD can be used to find repair locations in programs,
while in §IV-G we discuss how repairs can be generated based
on test cases. Finally, in §IV-F we highlight how INTGUARD
can be used to efficiently insert code repairs into programs.
A. System Overview
Fig. 4: System overview.
Figure 4 depicts the system overview of INTGUARD with
the corresponding components and steps involved in obtaining
the repaired programs. Initially, the source code ❶ of the
program is passed into the symbolic execution❷ engine, which
we specifically developed for this purpose. This component
can analyze C/C++ programs by first constructing a CFG for
each analyzed program and second, by extracting program
execution paths that will be symbolically analyzed. The control
flow graphs and syntax trees can be shared between worker
threads. Several workers concurrently explore different parts
of a program execution tree. Each worker thread has an
interpreter together with a memory system model to store and
retrieve symbolic variables (whose values are logic SMT-LIB
equations).
The used symbolic execution component in Figure 4 is
based on previous work [39]. The engine performs inter-
procedural, global symbolic execution rather than a compo-
sitional analysis, and the program statement to SMT con-
straint translator is implemented according to the tree-based
interpreter pattern [42]. Unsatisfiable program branches are
detected with the help of the Z3 solver [22]. The interaction
with the environment during symbolic execution is realized
through function summaries based on a C code skeleton, which
specifies the name of the function, its number and types of
parameters as well as return parameter type. Also, a function
inside each function summary emulates the real execution of
the function. This is achieved through the interplay between
the interpreter and SMT statements serving as new constraints,
which are added on top of the variables (similar to what
happens when the real program function is executed during
real program execution). Inside our engine, we use function
summaries for network system calls.
The algorithm used for encoding of C statements to SMT
statements is based on a bottom-up traversal of each program
statement located on a currently analyzed program execution
path. Single static assignment (SSA) variables will be created
when they are not existing for each variable encountered inside
the currently analyzed program statement. Before creating a
new variable, the interpreter will be queried in order to see if
there is already a symbolic variable. The C code statements
are translated into SMT-LIB [1] equations according to the
AUFNIRA logic. The translation of Control Flow Graph (CFG)
nodes into SMT-LIB syntax is performed by the translator
algorithm which extends the CDT’s abstract syntax tree (AST)
visitor class according to the visitor pattern [28]. At the end,
when the SMT statement creation is finished for a particular
program statement, the SMT statement will be attached to one
of the symbolic variables, which is a counterpart of one of the
variables contained in the original program statement. During
program execution traversal when an assignment statement
(i.e., others can be also supported) was encountered, the integer
overflow detection ❸ component is notified in order to check
if there is an integer overflow error or not. In case there was
an integer overflow error, this event will be reported to the
symbolic repair validation ❹ component. This component is
used in order to check if the negated SMT constraints, which
were used to check for the presence of the integer overflow,
could be used to invalidate the bug. In case that the result of
validation is a validated integer overflow repair ❺, a targeted
automatic repair ❻ can be generated. This repair has the goal
of removing the previously detected integer overflow.
After applying the repair, we obtain the patched source
code ❼ which is represents the original code with the ad-
ditional repair that was previously added. The repaired code
is again validated through the refactored code validation ❽
which consists of re-analyzing repaired code with the help
of the symbolic execution component. Optionally, at this step
the repaired code can be re-compiled in order to check if
the code is syntactically correct. Next, the integer overflow
detection ❸ component will be used a second time in order to
validate the bug. In case the bug is invalidated, we obtain an
invalidated integer overflow report ❾ indicating that the bug
was successfully removed and as such we get the repaired
source code ❿. In case, the integer overflow was not removed
after repair insertion, then the old (or a new) integer overflow
error will be reported, validated integer overflow report 11 .
Then, the result is not repaired source code 12 .
B. Symbolic Execution Engine Features
In the following, we present the main features of our
symbolic execution engine.
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1) Unrestricted Context Depth: Our symbolic execution
engine (see ❷ in Figure 4) performs an inter-procedural path-
sensitive analysis with a call string approach [71, 72]. For each
function a CFG is built. The function call context is represented
by a program path leading to its call.
2) Loop Unrolling Trade-offs: Each program loop can be
unrolled up to a certain depth or set to be unlimited. Currently,
we unroll each loop up to 10 times. We are aware that this
incurs accuracy degradation and makes our approach to be
unsound since not all possible program paths can be analyzed.
It is also possible to leave loop unrolling unconstrained, which
can lead in some cases to non-termination (e.g., endless loops)
where the number of loop iterations is not known upfront.
3) Library Calls: INTGUARD can handle library calls
(e.g., memset, memcpy, etc.) by providing upfront for each
of this functions a stub function which models the several
function behaviors: (1) required (consumed) variables, (2)
returned variables, (3) operations performed on the variables
of each of these functions, and (4) SMT constraints which
model interaction of the variables used as parameters for these
functions with other variables are attached to the corresponding
symbolic variables. During static program path analysis when
a library function is encountered than one of the available
function library modeling functions is used by the engine
interpreter. Finally, we assume that for each analyzed program
containing a library function call we have the corresponding
stub function defined upfront inside our engine.
4) Finding Program Paths: We use a fixed deterministic
thread scheduling algorithm for running the symbolic ex-
ecution. The symbolic execution is run with approximate
path coverage which uses Depth-First Search (DFS). During
DFS, program states are backtracked and branch decisions are
changed. The loop iteration bound can be configured either to
prune a path until the loop iteration bound is reached or to
bypass the loop by avoiding the branch validation check.
5) Automatic Slicing: The goal of automatic slicing [73] is
to keep the system of satisfiability checks as small as possible.
For this reason only relevant logic equations are passed to
the solver for verification. We perform automatic slicing over
the data flow in order to verify conditions on a program path
and over the control flow to separate the analysis of different
program paths.
6) Context Sharing for Different Checkers: Our engine
allows that multiple checkers (e.g., integer overflow, buffer
overflow, race condition, etc.) run in parallel during symbolic
execution. The checkers are allowed to share the contexts
because there is separation from the symbolic path interpreta-
tion. Each checker is allowed to receive notifications from a
symbolic interpreter in order to query context equations.
7) Logic Representation: We use the SMT-LIB sub-logic of
arrays, uninterpreted functions and non-linear integer and real
arithmetic (AUFNIRA) since this approach can be automati-
cally decided. Pointers for example are handled as symbolic
pointers by the engine interpreter with a target and a symbolic
integer as offset formula and outputted as logical formulas
when dereferenced.
8) Path Validation: The path validation is triggered at
branch nodes and uses the same interface as the checkers. For
all path decisions up to the current branch the path validator
queries the equation SMT-LIB linear system slice. The path
validator throws a path unsatisfiable exception if the solver
answer is unsatisfiable; then the symbolic execution proceeds
with the next path.
9) Satifiability Modulo Theories Solving: INTGUARD uses
SMT solving for three main purposes. First, for checking
satisfiable and not satisfiable program execution paths. This
helps to asses if certain program locations can be reached
during normal program execution. Second, for checking the
presence of an integer overflow additional SMT constraints
are added to SMT linear constraint system which was used to
check path satisfiability in order to check for the presence of
an integer overflow. Third, for checking if a repair removes an
integer overflow additional SMT constraints are added to the
SMT linear constraint system which was used to check path
satisfiability. Finally, for solving all the SMT constraints, we
use the Z3 [22] solver because of its precision and reduced
runtime overhead.
10) Path-sensitive Tracing of Shared Variables: It is pos-
sible to use shared variables between threads in a context-
sensitive way. This is accomplished by first marking all global
shared variables, and then the shared property is inferred over
data flow constructs such as references, assignments, function
call parameters and return values.
11) Posix Threads Support: We can accommodate envi-
ronment functions by specifying symbolic models of library
functions. In this way, the interaction with the environment
can be simulated.
12) Deep Nested C Structs: The C language program
statement to SMT translator engine component is designed to
recursively traverse deep nested C/C++ structures in order to
determine the real type of a field inside the struct. Accordingly,
our tool does not lose precision when dealing with C structs
data types.
13) Eclipse Extension: Our engine is integrated into the
Eclipse CDT API as a plug-in for the following main reasons:
1) to be able to parse C/C++ code, 2) to build a CFG of the
code 3) to allow for precise analysis of program statements
with an abstract syntax tree (AST) visitor, and 4) to translate
source code program statements to SMT constraints.
C. Overflow and Underflow Checks
Detecting if an arithmetic operation will overflow can be
reduced to checking that for an addition or subtraction of n-
bit values the result can be stored into a n+1 bits precision
variable. For a checked n-bit multiplication, the result should
be stored in a 2n bits precision variable. As [23] note, detecting
if the result fulfills the above stated conditions is difficult.
There are several ways to detect an overflow of an operation
having two signed integers s1 and s2.
First, we give the precondition used by the compiler based
tool IOC [23] to avoid an integer overflow during runtime. Our
goal is to highlight the differences between our precondition
checks and the one employed by IOC. Signed addition will
wrap if and only if the next expression evaluates to true.
((s1 > 0) ∧ (s2 > 0) ∧ (s1 > (INT_MAX− s2)))∨
((s1 < 0) ∧ (s2 < 0) ∧ (s1 < (INT_MAX− s2)))
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IOC checks that if the above precondition evaluates to false
than a failure handler will be called or the integer overflow
prone operation will be executed.
Second, we give the preconditions used by INTGUARD.
These are extending the above precondition for other arithmetic
operations, for integer underflows and for different integer
precisions.
Precondition 1. The addition of two integers in which one
is a variable and the other is a constant will not lead to an
integer overflow or to an integer underflow if the following
expression evaluates to true; s2 is the constant.
((s1 > 0) ∧ (s2 > 0) ∧ (s1 ≤ (INT_MAX− s2))∧
s1 ≥ (−INT_MAX− s2)))
Precondition 2. The multiplication of two integers in
which one is a variable and the other is a constant will not
lead to an integer overflow or to an integer underflow if the
following expression evaluates to true; s2 is the constant.
((s1 > 0) ∧ (s2 > 0) ∧ (s1 ≤ (INT_MAX/s2))∧
s1 ≥ (−INT_MAX/s2− 1)))
Precondition 3. The multiplication of two equal integers
will not lead to an integer overflow or to an integer underflow
if the following expression evaluates to true.
((s1 > 0) ∧ (s2 > 0) ∧ (sqrt(s1) ≤ (sqrt(INT_MAX)))∧
−sqrt(s1) ≥ (−sqrt(INT_MAX))))
In contrast to IOC, if one of the preconditions evaluates
to true then the operation will be performed, otherwise a
failure handler will be called. The above preconditions are used
over multiple types of inputs for s1 or s2 (i.e., RAND32(),
this is the wrapper for the C random function, fscanf(),
etc.). The preconditions can be applied over multiple integer
precisions, meaning that INT_MAX can take different values
depending on the currently used integer precision in the
analyzed program. We call this value the maximum admissible
upper bound value for an integer. This value is determined
automatically during program analysis. Further, the variables
s1 or s2 can take different types: char, int64_t, int,
short, unsigned int. In contrast to IOC preconditions
which will help to avoid an unconfirmed integer overflow
during compile time, our preconditions will lead to code re-
factorings that will surround the code location where the
integer overflow was detected and confirmed.
D. Repair Generation Algorithm
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Fig. 5: Repair generation algorithm main steps.
Figure 5 depicts the eight steps of the INTGUARD repair
generation algorithm which are used to generate source code
repairs. At the same time, these steps represent a more detailed
view of the step ❿ depicted in Figure 13.
1) Determine Integer Upper Bound: Figure 6 depicts a C
language code snippet extracted from an analyzed program
in which an integer upper bound value (i.e., CHAR_MAX) is
used. In order to determine the currently used integer upper
upper bound value for an integer. This value is determined
automatically during program analysis. Further, the variables
s1 or s2 can take different types: char, int64_t, int,
short, unsigned int. In contrast to IOC preconditions
which will help to avoid an unconfirmed integer overflow
during compile time, our preconditions will lead to code re-
factorings that will surround the code location where the
integer overflow was detected and confirmed.
D. Repair Generation Algorithm
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Fig. 4: Repair generation algorithm main steps.
Figure 4 depicts the eight steps of the INTGUARD repair
generation algorithm which are used to generate source code
repairs. At the same time, these steps represent a more detailed
view of the step ❿ depicted in Figure 12.
1) Determin Integer Upper Bound: Figure 5 depicts a C
language code snippet extracted from an analyzed program
in which an integer upper bound value (i.e., CHAR_MAX) is
used. In order to determine th curr ntly used integer upper
1 /*limits.h*/
2 #define SCHAR_MAX __SCHAR_MAX__
3 #define CHAR_MAX SCHAR_MAX
4 /*our test program*/
5 if (data < (CHAR_MAX/2)){/*do*/}
Fig. 5: Selecting upper bound value.
bound value in the analyzed program, INTGUARD performs the
following steps. First, INTGUARD parses the contents of the
file located at usr/include/limits.h (i.e., Linux OS)
which contains the integer upper bound values for each integer
type for the currently used OS. Note that the previous path
has to be specified in advance as this may vary on different
OSs. Second, during the analyzed program path traversal
INTGUARD searches for previously in the program defined
and used integer upper bound program variables. This search
is realized by comparing each declared or used variable (see if
condition in Figure 5) name contained in the currently analyzed
program execution path with one of the supported integer up-
per bound values (i.e., CHAR_MAX, INT_MAX, LLONG_MAX,
SHRT_MAX, and UINT_MAX). Third, in case such an upper
bound value is found and used (i.e., inside an assignment-,
addition-operation, etc.), it will be set to be the currently used
integer upper bound value. In this way, the integer precision is
determined for each analyzed program individually. Next, this
upper bound value will be used to check for integer overflows
❶ and for validating generated candidate code repairs. Finally,
note that by following the above steps, INTGUARD updates
the used upper bound value automatically for each analyzed
program.
2) Clustering Bug Detection Information: In this step, the
symbolic variables and the specific constraints (i.e., the ones
used inside the integer overflow checker) which were used
to detect the integer overflow will be clustered and stored in
external data structures.
1 /*C language assignment statement*/
2 int result = varA + varB;
3 /*SMT counterpart equation of the above assignment*/
4 (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic)))
Fig. 6: C language statement and SMT counterpart.
Figure 6 depicts a C language assignment statement and
its SMT counterpart. The C assignment statement depicts
the addition of two variables and the result is stored in a
third variable. This statement will be translated into the SMT
constraint contained at line number 4 in Figure 6. Based on
the structure of the C language statement and how many
symbolic variables were used to detect the integer overflow
bug, different types of bug detection information have to be
stored in external data structures for later processing. For the
statement depicted in Figure 6 at line number 2, INTGUARD
will store: the statement where the bug was detected, the SMT
constraint system used to detect the bug in first place, the
bug ID (to identify which bug type was detected), the sym-
bolic variable which was used to detect the integer overflow,
and optionally other symbolic variables on which the integer
overflow triggering variable depends directly. An external data
structure basically represents an aggregation of the symbolic
variables used to detect the bug together with the particular
integer overflow SMT checking constraints. Finally, the key
reason for generating these additional data structures is to
help to group relevant data together and to facilitate a better
handling of this information in later steps.
3) Select Constraint Values: INTGUARD selects ❸ the
relevant SMT constraint variables based on the type of C
language statement where upfront the integer overflow was
detected.
1 /*SMT counterpart equation of the above assignment*/
2 (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic)))
Fig. 7: Selecting relevant symbolic variable(s).
Figure 7 depicts with gray shaded color the symbolic
variable resSymbolic. This variable was selected by INT-
GUARD to be further constrained in order to check if the
code repair that will be generated could remove the previ-
ously detected integer overflow bug. Note that depending on
the complexity of the analyzed statement (where the integer
overflow was detected) more or less variables can be taken
into consideration in order to determine if the previously
detected integer overflow would further manifest depending
on how the selected symbolic variables were constrained.
Finally, the selected variables will be used in the next step
when re-constraining the bounds during the checking of SMT
constraints of the SMT system (which was used upfront to
detect the integer overflow).
4) Re-constrain the Bound Checking Constraints: After
collecting all the path constraints ❹ for a single program
execution path, INTGUARD adds the SMT constraints which
check for the presence of an integer overflow. The presence of
an integer overflow bug is indicated if for the selected SMT
6
Fig. 6: Selecting upper bound value.
bound value in the analyz d program, INTGUARD performs the
following steps. First, INTGUARD parses the contents of the
file located at usr/include/limits.h (i.e., Linux OS)
which contains the integer upper bound valu s for each int ger
type for the curr ntly used OS. Note that the previous path
has to be specified in advance as this may v ry on different
OSs. Second, during the analyzed program path traversal
INTGUARD searches for previou ly in the program defined
and used integer upper bound program variables. This se rch
is realized by comparing each declared or used v iable (see if
condition in Figure 6) ame contained in the currently analyzed
program executi n path with o e of the supported integer up-
per bound valu s (i.e., CHAR_MAX, INT_MAX, LLONG_MAX,
SHRT_MAX, and UINT_MAX). Third, in case such a upper
bound value is found and used (i.e., insid an assignm nt-,
addition-operation, etc.), it will b set to be the currently us d
integer upper bound valu . In this w y, the integer precision is
determined for ach analyzed program individually. Next, this
upper bound valu will be used to check for integer overflows
❶ and for validati g generated candidate code repairs. Finally,
note that by following the ab ve steps, INTGUARD updates
the used upper boun valu automatically for each nalyzed
program.
2) Clustering Bug Detection Information: this s ep, the
symbolic variables and the sp cific constraints (i.e., the ones
used inside the integer overflow checker) which were used
to detect the integer overflow will be clustered and stored in
external data structures.
upper bound value for an integer. This value is etermin d
automatically d ring program analysi . Further, the variables
s1 or s2 can take different types: cha , in 64_t, int,
short, u signed int. In contrast to IOC preconditions
which will help to avoid an unconfirmed integer overflow
during compile time, ur preconditions will l ad t code re-
factorings that will surround the code location where the
integer overflo wa detected and confirmed.
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Fig. 4: Repair generation algorithm main steps.
Figure 4 depicts the eight steps of the INTGUARD repair
generation algorithm which are used to generate source code
repairs. At the same time, these steps represent a more detailed
view of the step ❿ depicted in Figure 12.
1) Determine Integer Upper Bound: Figure 5 depicts a C
language code snippet extracted from an analyzed program
in which an integer upper bound value (i.e., CHAR_MAX) is
used. In order to determine the currently used integer upper
1 /*limits.h*/
2 #define SCHAR_MAX __SCHAR_MAX__
3 #define CHAR_MAX SCHAR_MAX
4 /*our test program*/
5 if (data < (CHAR_MAX/2)){/*do*/}
Fig. 5: Selecting upper bound value.
bound value in the analyzed program, INTGUARD performs the
following steps. First, INTGUARD parses the contents of the
file located at usr/include/limits.h (i.e., Linux OS)
which contains the integer upper bound values for each integer
type for the currently used OS. Note that the previous path
has to be specified in advance as this may vary on different
OSs. Second, during the analyzed program path traversal
INTGUARD searches for previously in the program defined
and used integer upper bound program variables. This search
is realized by comparing each declared or used variable (see if
condition in Figure 5) name contained in the currently analyzed
program execution path with one of the supported integer up-
per bound values (i.e., CHAR_MAX, INT_MAX, LLONG_MAX,
SHRT_MAX, and UINT_MAX). Third, in case such an upper
bound value is found and used (i.e., inside an assignment-,
addition-operation, etc.), it will be set to be the currently used
integer upper bound value. In this way, the integer precision is
determined for each analyzed program individually. Next, this
upper bound value will be used to check for integer overflows
❶ and for validating generated candidate code repairs. Finally,
note that by following the above steps, INTGUARD updates
the used upper bound value automatically for each analyzed
program.
2) Clustering Bug Detection Information: In this step, the
symbolic variables and the specific constraints (i.e., the ones
used inside the integer overflow checker) which were used
to d tec the integer overflow will be clust red and stored in
external d ta structures.
1 /*C language assignment statement*/
2 int result = varA + varB;
3 /*SMT counterpart equation of the above assignment*/
4 (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic)))
Fig. 6: C language statement and SMT counterpart.
Figure 6 depicts a C language assignment statement and
its SMT counterpart. The C assignment statement depicts
the addition of two variables and the result is stored in a
third variable. This statement will be translated into the SMT
constraint contained at line number 4 in Figure 6. Based on
the structure of the C language statement and how many
symbolic variables were used to detect the integer overflow
bug, different types of bug detection information have to be
stored in external data structures for later processing. For the
statement depicted in Figure 6 at line number 2, INTGUARD
will store: the statement where the bug was detected, the SMT
constraint system used to detect the bug in first place, the
bug ID (to identify which bug type was detected), the sym-
bolic variable which was used to detect the integer overflow,
and optionally other symbolic variables on which the integer
overflow triggering variable depends directly. An external data
structure basically represents an aggregation of the symbolic
variables used to detect the bug together with the particular
integer overflow SMT checking constraints. Finally, the key
reason for generating these additional data structures is to
help to group relevant data together and to facilitate a better
handling of this information in later steps.
3) Select Constraint Values: INTGUARD selects ❸ the
relevant SMT constraint variables based on the type of C
language statement where upfront the integer overflow was
detected.
1 /*SMT counterpart equation of the above assignment*/
2 (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic)))
Fig. 7: Selecting relevant symbolic variable(s).
Figure 7 depicts with gray shaded color the symbolic
variable resSymbolic. This variable was selected by INT-
GUARD to be further constrained in order to check if the
code repair that will be generated could remove the previ-
ously detected integer overflow bug. Note that depending on
the complexity of the analyzed statement (where the integer
overflow was detected) more or less variables can be taken
into consideration in order to determine if the previously
detected integer overflow would further manifest depending
on how the selected symbolic variables were constrained.
Finally, the selected variables will be used in the next step
when re-constraining the bounds during the checking of SMT
constraints of the SMT system (which was used upfront to
detect the integer overflow).
4) Re-constrain the Bound Checking Constraints: After
collecting all the path constraints ❹ for a single program
execution path, INTGUARD adds the SMT constraints which
check for the presence of an integer overflow. The presence of
an integer overflow bug is indicated if for the selected SMT
6
Fig. 7: C language statement and SMT counterpart.
Figure 7 depicts a C language assignment sta ement and
its SMT counterpart. The C assignment sta ement depicts
the ad it on of two variables and the result is stored in a
third variable. This ta ement will be translated into the SMT
constraint contained at line number 4 in Figure 7. Based on
the structure of the C language sta ement and how many
symbolic variables wer used to det ct he integer overflow
bug, differ nt ypes of bug det ction information have to be
stored in external dat structures for later processing. For the
sta ement depicted in Figure 7 at line number 2, INTGUARD
will store: the sta ement wher the bug was det cted, the SMT
constraint system used to det ct the bug in first place, the
bug ID (to identify which bug type was det cted), the sym-
bolic variable which was used to det ct he integer overflow,
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and optionally other symbolic variables on which the integer
overflow triggering variable depends directly. An external data
structure represents an aggregation of the symbolic variables
used to detect the bug together with the particular integer
overflow SMT checking constraints. Finally, the key reason
for generating these additional data structures is to help to
group relevant data together and to facilitate a better handling
of this information in later steps.
3) Select Constraint Values: INTGUARD selects ❸ the
relevant SMT constraint variables based on the type of C
language statement where upfront the integer overflow was
detected.
upper bound value for an integer. This value is determined
automatically during program analysis. Further, the variables
s1 or s2 can take different types: char, int64_t, int,
short, unsigned int. In contrast to IOC preconditions
which will help to avoid an unconfirmed integer overflow
during compile time, our preconditions will lead to code re-
factorings that will surround the code location where the
integer overflow was detected and confirmed.
D. Repair Generation Algorithm
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Fig. 4: Repair generation algorithm main steps.
Figure 4 depicts the eight steps of the INTGUARD repair
generation algorithm which are used to generate source code
repairs. At the same time, these steps represent a more detailed
view of the step ❿ depicted in Figure 12.
1) Determine Integer Upper Bound: Figure 5 depicts a C
language code snippet extracted from an analyzed program
in which an integer upper bound value (i.e., CHAR_MAX) is
used. In order to determine the currently used integer upper
1 /*limits.h*/
2 #define SCHAR_MAX __SCHAR_MAX__
3 #define CHAR_MAX SCHAR_MAX
4 /*our test program*/
5 if (data < (CHAR_MAX/2)){/*do*/}
Fig. 5: Selecting upper bound value.
bound value in the analyzed program, INTGUARD performs the
following steps. First, INTGUARD parses the contents of the
file located at usr/include/limits.h (i.e., Linux OS)
which contains the integer upper bound values for each integer
type for the currently used OS. Note that the previous path
has to be specified in advance as this may vary on different
OSs. Second, during the analyzed program path traversal
INTGUARD searches for previously in the program defined
and used integer upper bound program variables. This search
is realized by comparing each declared or used variable (see if
condition in Figure 5) name contained in the currently analyzed
program execution path with one of the supported integer up-
per bound values (i.e., CHAR_MAX, INT_MAX, LLONG_MAX,
SHRT_MAX, and UINT_MAX). Third, in case such an upper
bound value is found and used (i.e., inside an assignment-,
addition-operation, etc.), it will be set to be the currently used
integer upper bound value. In this way, the integer precision is
determined for each analyzed program individually. Next, this
upper bound value will be used to check for integer overflows
❶ and for validating generated candidate code repairs. Finally,
note that by following the above steps, INTGUARD updates
the used upper bound value automatically for each analyzed
program.
2) Clustering Bug Detection Information: In this step, the
symbolic variables and the specific constraints (i.e., the ones
used inside the integer overflow checker) which were used
to detect the integer overflow will be clustered and stored in
external data structures.
1 /*C language assignment statement*/
2 int result = varA + varB;
3 /*SMT counterpart equation of the above assignment*/
4 (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic)))
Fig. 6: C language statement and SMT counterpart.
Figure 6 depicts a C language assignment statement and
its SMT counterpart. The C assignment statement depicts
the addition of two variables and the result is stored in a
third variable. This statement will be translated into the SMT
constraint contained at line number 4 in Figure 6. Based on
the structure of the C language statement and how many
symbolic variables were used to detect the integer overflow
bug, different types of bug detection information have to be
stored in external data structures for later processing. For the
statement depicted in Figure 6 at line number 2, INTGUARD
will store: the statement where the bug was detected, the SMT
constraint system used to detect the bug in first place, the
bug ID (to identify which bug type was detected), the sym-
bolic variable which was used to detect the integer overflow,
and optionally other symbolic variables on which the integer
overflow triggering variable depends directly. An external data
structure basically represents an aggregation of the symbolic
variables used to detect the bug together with the particular
integer overflow SMT checking constraints. Finally, the key
reason for generating these additional data structures is to
help to group relevant data together and to facilitate a better
handling of this information in later steps.
3) Select Constraint Values: INTGUARD selects ❸ the
relevant SMT constraint variables based on the type of C
language statement where upfront the integer overflow was
detected.
1 /*SMT counterpart equation of the above assignment*/
2 (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic)))
Fig. 7: Selecting relevant symbolic variable(s).
Figure 7 depicts with gray shaded color the symbolic
variable resSymbolic. This variable was selected by INT-
GUARD to be further constrained in order to check if the
code repair that will be generated could remove the previ-
ously detected integer overflow bug. Note that depending on
the complexity of the analyzed statement (where the integer
overflow was detected) more or less variables can be taken
into consideration in order to determine if the previously
detected integer overflow would further manifest depending
on how the selected symbolic variables were constrained.
Finally, the selected variables will be used in the next step
when re-constraining the bounds during the checking of SMT
constraints of the SMT system (which was used upfront to
detect the integer overflow).
4) Re-constrain the Bound Checking Constraints: After
collecting all the path constraints ❹ for a single program
execution path, INTGUARD adds the SMT constraints which
check for the presence of an integer overflow. The presence of
an integer overflow bug is indicated if for the selected SMT
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Fig. 8: Selecting relevant symbolic variable(s).
Figure 8 depicts with gray shaded color the symbolic
variable resSymbolic. This variable was selected by INT-
GUARD to be further constrained in order to check if the
code repair that will be generated could remove the previ-
ously detected integer overflow bug. Note that depending on
the complexity of the analyzed statement (where the integer
overflow was detected) more or less variables can be taken
into consideration in order to determine if the previously
detected integer overflow would further manifest depending
on how the selected symbolic variables were constrained.
Finally, the selected variables will be used in the next step
when re-constraining the bounds during the checking of SMT
constraints of the SMT system (which was used upfront to
detect the integer overflow).
4) Re-constrain the Bound Checking Constraints: After
collecting all the path constraints ❹ for a single program
execution path, INTGUARD adds the SMT constraints which
check for the presence of an integer overflow. The presence of
an integer overflow bug is indicated if for the selected SMT
system the Z3 solver reports SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow
bug present).
system the Z3 solver reports SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow
bug present).
1 /*original SMT equation*/
2 (assert (> resSymbolic 2147483647 ))
3 /*negated SMT equation*/
4 (assert (< resSymbolic 2147483647 ))
Fig. 8: The original and the newly added SMT constraint.
Figure 8 depicts the original SMT equation (line 2) and a
second SMT constraining equation (line 4) on the previously
selected variable. INTGUARD re-constraints (i.e., through in-
teger upper bound negation) the selected variable(s) selected
from the previous step in order to determine a potential
interval which will not lead to a second integer overflow of
the symbolic variable (which previously was used to detect
the integer overflow). The goal is to determine if there will
a second integer overflow if INTGUARD re-constraints the
selected variables. For this purpose INTGUARD checks again
in the next step if for the new SMT constraint system (see
next step) it gets an UNSAT (unsatisfiable, no integer overflow
bug present) solver reply. The new constrained SMT will
be composed of the old SMT constraint system which was
used to detect the integer overflow complemented with the
re-constrained SMT equations. If INTGUARD gets an UNSAT
solver reply then it determines that there will be no integer
overflow if it re-constraints the selected variable(s) with the
new constraints (e.g., variable range negation, etc.) and as
such the integer overflow can be avoided. It follows, that the
information collected at this step can be used to construct in
a later step the final code repair. Note that this approach can
be extended to other scenarios; e.g., more complex constraints
can be added and checked if required for other types of bugs.
5) Determine New Constraint System: In this step ❺,
INTGUARD assembles the new SMT constraint system which
will be used to determine if the previously detected integer
overflow is still present. During this step, INTGUARD takes the
constraints determined at the previous step and inserts them in
the SMT constraint system which was used to detect the integer
overflow.
1...
2/*original SMT
3constraint*/
4(assert (> resSymbolic
52147483647 ))
6...
(a)
→
1...
2/*negated SMT
3constraint*/
4(assert (< resSymbolic
52147483647 ))
6...
(b)
Fig. 9: Composing the new SMT system.
Figure 9 (a, b) depict the replacement process of the old
SMT sub-system (component) with a new SMT sub-system
that was determined at the previous step. Before inserting
the new constraints in the SMT system, INTGUARD needs
to remove the original SMT constraints that were used to
detect the presence of the integer overflow. The decision which
SMT constraints have to be removed from the SMT system
(used to detect the integer overflow presence) is made based
on the modular aggregation of these SMT statements inside
the integer overflow checker in which these constraints are
put together. More precisely, since the SMT constraints used
to check for an integer overflow are added in the integer
overflow checker in an incremental building block fashion,
INTGUARD can precisely determine which constraints can be
safely removed and replaced with new ones determined at the
previous step. Next, this SMT system will be fed into the Z3
solver. In case the solver replies SAT, then the constraints
added represent valid constraints which can be used to remove
the previously detected integer overflow. Finally, this SMT
constraint system will serve as confirmation that the integer
overflow can be removed if certain symbolic variables are
constrained in an appropriate way. Note that these symbolic
variables have counterparts, which will be inserted when
assembling the final code repair.
6) Determine Bug Type: The integer overflow checker
runs in parallel in our engine with other checkers (e.g., race
condition checker, buffer overflow checker, etc.), which are
currently available in our engine. Each bug checker generates
a report containing an unique bug identifier (i.e., time stamp
based + checker unique identifier) for each detected bug. Based
on the generated bug identifier, INTGUARD can determine
which bug type ❻ it currently deals with. This information
is extracted from the external data structures constructed at
step 2. With this information, INTGUARD checks in the list
of currently supported checkers to which checker this stored
identifies belongs to. Based on this information, INTGUARD
can determine which repair pattern can be used to repair the
previously detected integer overflow.
1if(leftHandSide.equals(
2rightHandSide)&&
3operator.equals("*")) {
4...
5return "if(sqrt("+leftHandSide
6+") <= sqrt(" + value4
7+") && -sqrt("+ rightHandSide
8+") >= -sqrt("+value5
9+"))"+"{"+"\n"+"\t"+"\t"+"\t"
10+buggyStm10 + "\n }else{ \n"
11
12//v.1: not used
13//+ "return;" + " }\n";
14
15//v.2: not used
16//+ "logg_IO_error(ID);"
17//+ " }\n";
18
19//Version 3: used
20+"FILE *fp=fopen (\"IO_"
21+"error_log.txt\", + \"w+\");"
22+"\n fprintf(fp, \"IO_ID:%s
23+FileName:%s LineNumber:%d",
24+FileName+","+IO_bug+","
25+LineNumber+");"
26+"\n fclose(fp);" + " }\n";
27}
Fig. 10: Code repair pattern.
7) Select Repair Pat-
tern: Based on the previ-
ous determined bug iden-
tifier (see ❻), INTGUARD
selects from the repair pat-
tern ❼ pool the repairs
suited for integer overflow
repair. INTGUARD repair
patterns consist of empty
C code skeletons (stubs)
where C statement parts
will be replaced with con-
crete values after their val-
ues have been computed
as presented in ❹ or with
other types of mathemat-
ical operations (e.g., di-
vision by a value). Also,
note that in some situ-
ations place holder vari-
ables will be replaced with
corresponding mathemati-
cal functions such as the square root function sqrt or other
functions. In these situations, INTGUARD does not compute
the value of the function upfront but rather leaves this to be
computed later during symbolic execution analysis or program
runtime. This offers the advantage that INTGUARD does not
need to be able to compute any possible mathematical function
before program runtime. Figure 10 depicts a code repair pattern
used by INTGUARD during integer overflow error repairing
(see generated repair in Figure 2). If not noted otherwise, each
code repair pattern contains C code compatible snippets (i.e.,
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Fig. 9: The original and the newly added SMT constraint.
Figure 9 depicts the original SMT equation (line 2) and a
second SMT constraining equation (line 4) on the previously
selected variable. INTGUARD re-constraints (i.e., through in-
teger upper bound negation) the selected variable(s) selected
from the previous step in order to determine a potential
interval which will not lead to a second integer overflow of
the symbolic variable (which previously was used to detect
the integer overflow). The goal is to determine if there will
be a second integer overflow if INTGUARD re-constraints the
selected variables. For this purpose INTGUARD checks again
in the next step if for the new SMT constraint system (see
next step) it gets an UNSAT (unsatisfiable, no integer overflow
bug present) solver reply. The new constrained SMT will
be composed of the old SMT constraint system which was
used to detect the integer overflow complemented with the
re-constrained SMT equations. If INTGUARD gets an UNSAT
solver reply then it determines that there will be no integer
overflow if it re-constraints the selected variable(s) with the
new constraints (e.g., variable range negation, etc.) and as
such the integer overflow can be avoided. It follows, that the
information collected at this step can be used to construct in
a later step the final code repair. Note that this approach can
be extended to other scenarios; e.g., more complex constraints
can be added and checked if required for other types of bugs.
5) Determine New Constraint System: In this step ❺,
INTGUARD assembles the new SMT constraint system which
will be used to determine if the previously detected integer
overflow is still present. During this step, INTGUARD takes the
constraints determined at the previous step and inserts them in
the SMT constraint system which was used to detect the integer
overflow.
system the Z3 solver reports SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow
bug present).
1 /*original SMT equation*/
2 (assert (> resSymbolic 2147483647 ))
3 /*negated SMT equation*/
4 (assert (< resSymbolic 2147483647 ))
Fig. 8: The original and the newly added SMT constraint.
Figure 8 depicts the original SMT equation (line 2) and a
second SMT constraining equation (line 4) on the previously
selected variable. INTGUARD re-constraints (i.e., through in-
teger upper bound negation) the selected variable(s) selected
from the previous step in order to determine a potential
interval which will not lead to a second integer overflow of
the symbolic variable (which previously was used to detect
the integer overflow). The goal is to determine if there will
a second integer overflow if INTGUARD re-constraints the
selected variables. For this purpose INTGUARD checks again
in the next step if for the new SMT constraint system (see
next step) it gets an UNSAT (unsatisfiable, no integer overflow
bug present) solver reply. The new constrained SMT will
be composed of the old SMT constraint system which was
used to detect the integer overflow complemented with the
re-constrained SMT equations. If INTGUARD gets an UNSAT
solver reply then it determines that there will be no integer
overflow if it re-constraints the selected variable(s) with the
new constraints (e.g., variable range negation, etc.) and as
such the integer overflow can be avoided. It follows, that the
information collected at this step can be used to construct in
a later step the final code repair. Note that this approach can
be extended to other scenarios; e.g., more complex constraints
can be added and checked if required for other types of bugs.
5) Determine New Constraint System: In this step ❺,
INTGUARD assembles the new SMT constraint system which
will be used to determine if the previously detected integer
overflow is still present. During this step, INTGUARD takes the
constraints determined at the previous step and inserts them in
the SMT constraint system which was used to detect the integer
overflow.
1...
2/*original SMT
3constraint*/
4(assert (> resSymbolic
52147483647 ))
6...
(a)
→
1...
2/*negated SMT
3constraint*/
4(assert (< resSymbolic
52147483647 ))
6...
(b)
Fig. 9: Composing the new SMT system.
Figure 9 (a, b) depict the replacement process of the old
SMT sub-system (component) with a new SMT sub-system
that was determined at the previous step. Before inserting
the new constraints in the SMT system, INTGUARD needs
to remove the original SMT constraints that were used to
detect the presence of the integer overflow. The decision which
SMT constraints have to be removed from the SMT system
(used to detect the integer overflow presence) is made based
on the modular aggregation of these SMT statements inside
the integer overflow checker in which these constraints are
put together. More precisely, since the SMT constraints used
to check for an integer overflow are added in the integer
overflow checker in an incremental building block fashion,
INTGUARD can precisely determine which constraints can be
safely removed and replaced with new ones determined at the
previous step. Next, this SMT system will be fed into the Z3
solver. In case the solver replies SAT, then the constraints
added represent valid constraints which can be used to remove
the previously detected integer overflow. Finally, this SMT
constraint system will serve as confirmation that the integer
overflow can be removed if certain symbolic variables are
constrained in an appropriate way. Note that these symbolic
variables have counterparts, which will be inserted when
assembling the final code repair.
6) Determine Bug Type: The integer overflow checker
runs in parallel in our engine with other checkers (e.g., race
condition checker, buffer overflow checker, etc.), which are
currently available in our engine. Each bug checker generates
a report containing an unique bug identifier (i.e., time stamp
based + checker unique identifier) for each detected bug. Based
on the generated bug identifier, INTGUARD can determine
which bug type ❻ it currently deals with. This information
is extracted from the external data structures constructed at
step 2. With this information, INTGUARD checks in the list
of currently supported checkers to which checker this stored
identifies belongs to. Based on this information, INTGUARD
can determine which repair pattern can be used to repair the
previously detected integer overflow.
1if(leftHandSide.equals(
2rightHandSide)&&
3operator.equals("*")) {
4...
5return "if(sqrt("+leftHandSide
6+") <= sqrt(" + value4
7+") && -sqrt("+ rightHandSide
8+") >= -sqrt("+value5
9+"))"+"{"+"\n"+"\t"+"\t"+"\t"
10+buggyStm10 + "\n }else{ \n"
11
12//v.1: not used
13//+ "return;" + " }\n";
14
15//v.2: not used
16//+ "logg_IO_error(ID);"
17//+ " }\n";
18
19//Version 3: used
20+"FILE *fp=fopen (\"IO_"
21+"error_log.txt\", + \"w+\");"
22+"\n fprintf(fp, \"IO_ID:%s
23+FileName:%s LineNumber:%d",
24+FileName+","+IO_bug+","
25+LineNumber+");"
26+"\n fclose(fp);" + " }\n";
27}
Fig. 10: Code repair pattern.
7) Select Repair Pat-
tern: Based on the previ-
ous determined bug iden-
tifier (see ❻), INTGUARD
selects from the repair pat-
tern ❼ pool the repairs
suited for integer overflow
repair. INTGUARD repair
patterns consist of empty
C code skeletons (stubs)
where C statement parts
will be replaced with con-
crete values after their val-
ues have been computed
as presented in ❹ or with
other types of mathemat-
ical operations (e.g., di-
vision by a value). Also,
note that in some situ-
ations place holder vari-
ables will be replaced with
corresponding mathemati-
cal functions such as the square root function sqrt or other
functions. In these situations, INTGUARD does not compute
the value of the function upfront but rather leaves this to be
computed later during symbolic execution analysis or program
runtime. This offers the advantage that INTGUARD does not
need to be able to compute any possible mathematical function
before program runtime. Figure 10 depicts a code repair pattern
used by INTGUARD during integer overflow error repairing
(see generated repair in Figure 2). If not noted otherwise, each
code repair pattern contains C code compatible snippets (i.e.,
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Figure 10 ( , ) i t the replace ent process of the old
SMT sub-system (component) with a new SMT sub-system
that was determined at the previous step. Before inserting
the new constraints in the SMT system, INTGUARD ne ds
to remove the original SMT constraints that were used to
detect the presence of the integer overflow. The decision which
SMT constraints have to be removed from the SMT system
(used to detect the integer overflow presence) is made based
on the modular ag regation of these SMT statements inside
the integer overflow checker in which these constraints are
put together. More precis ly, sinc the SMT constraints used
to check for an integer ov rflow are added in the integer
overflow checker in an incremental building block fashion,
INTGUARD can precisely determine which constraints can be
safely removed and r pl ced with new ones determined at the
previous step. Next, this SMT system will be fed into the Z3
solver. In case the solver rep ies SAT, then the constraints
added represent valid constraints which can be used to remove
the previously detected integ r overflow. Finally, this SMT
constraint system will serve as confirmation that the integer
overflow can be removed if certain symbolic variables are
constrained in a appropri te way. Note that these symbolic
variables have count rparts, which will be insert d when
assembling the fi al code repair.
6) Determine Bug Type: The integer ov rflow checker
runs in parallel in our engine with other check rs ( .g., rac
condition checker, buffer overflow checker, etc.), whi h are
currently available in our engine. Each bug checker generates
a report containing an u ique bug id ntifier (i.e., time stamp
based + checker uniqu identifier) for each det cted bug. Based
on the generated bug i entifier, INTGUARD can determine
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which bug type ❻ it currently deals with. This information
is extracted from the external data structures constructed at
step 2. With this information, INTGUARD checks in the list
of currently supported checkers to which checker this stored
identifies belongs to. Based on this information, INTGUARD
can determine which repair pattern can be used to repair the
previously detected integer overflow.
7) Select Repair Pattern: Based on the previous determined
bug identifier (see ❻), INTGUARD selects from the repair
pattern ❼ pool the repairs suited for integer overflow repair.
INTGUARD repair patterns consist of empty C code skeletons
(stubs) where C statement parts will be replaced with concrete
values after their values have been computed as presented in ❹
or with other types of mathematical operations (e.g., division
by a value). Also, note that in some situations place holder
variables will be replaced with corresponding mathematical
functions such as the square root function sqrt or other
functions. In these situations, INTGUARD does not compute
the value of the function upfront but rather leaves this to be
computed later during symbolic execution analysis or program
runtime. This offers the advantage that INTGUARD does not
need to be able to compute any possible mathematical function
before program runtime.
Figure 11 depicts a code repair pattern used by INT-
GUARD during integer overflow error repairing (see gener-
ated repair in Figure 2). If not noted otherwise, each code
repair pattern contains C code compatible snippets (i.e., code
in red font) interleaved with variables that will be inserted
in the repair after the integer overflow was detected and
before the repair will be inserted into the buggy program.
The code repair contains several stub variables which will
be replaced with concrete variables names and values de-
pending on the type of code statement containing the bug.
system the Z3 solver reports SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow
bug present).
1 /*original SMT equation*/
2 (assert (> resSymbolic 2147483647 ))
3 /*negated SMT equation*/
4 (assert (< resSymbolic 2147483647 ))
Fig. 8: The original and the newly added SMT constraint.
Figure 8 depicts the original SMT equation (line 2) and a
second SMT constraining equation (line 4) on the previously
selected variable. INTGUARD re-constraints (i.e., through in-
teger upper bound negation) the selected variable(s) selected
from the previous step in order to determine a potential
interval which will not lead to a second integer overflow of
the symbolic variable (which previously was used to detect
the integer overflow). The goal is to determine if there will
a second integer overflow if INTGUARD re-constraints the
selected variables. For this purpose INTGUARD checks again
in the next step if for the new SMT constraint system (see
next step) it gets an UNSAT (unsatisfiable, no integer overflow
bug present) solver reply. The new constrained SMT will
be composed of the old SMT constraint system which was
used to detect the integer overflow complemented with the
re-constrained SMT equations. If INTGUARD gets an UNSAT
solver reply then it determines that there will be no integer
overflow if it re-constraints the selected variable(s) with the
new constraints (e.g., variable range negation, etc.) and as
such the integer overflow can be avoided. It follows, that the
information collected at this step can be used to construct in
a later step the final code repair. Note that this approach can
be extended to other scenarios; e.g., more complex constraints
can be added and checked if required for other types of bugs.
5) Determine New Constraint System: In this step ❺,
INTGUARD assembles the new SMT constraint system which
will be used to determine if the previously detected integer
overflow is still present. During this step, INTGUARD takes the
constraints determined at the previous step and inserts them in
the SMT constraint system which was used to detect the integer
overflow.
1...
2/*original SMT
3constraint*/
4(assert (> resSymbolic
52147483647 ))
6...
(a)
→
1...
2/*negated SMT
3constraint*/
4(assert (< resSymbolic
52147483647 ))
6...
(b)
Fig. 9: Composing the new SMT system.
Figure 9 (a, b) depict the replacement process of the old
SMT sub-system (component) with a new SMT sub-system
that was determined at the previous step. Before inserting
the new constraints in the SMT system, INTGUARD needs
to remove the original SMT constraints that were used to
detect the presence of the integer overflow. The decision which
SMT constraints have to be removed from the SMT system
(used to detect the integer overflow presence) is made based
on the modular aggregation of these SMT statements inside
the int ger overflow ch cker in whi h th se constraints are
put together. Mor precisely, since the SMT constraints used
to check for an integer overflow are added in the integer
overflow check r n an incremental building block fashion,
INTGUARD can pr cisely determine which constrain s can be
safely removed and repl ced w h new o s determined at the
previous step. Next, this SMT system will be fed into the Z3
solver. In case the solver replies SAT, then the constraints
added repr sent valid constraints which can be used to r move
the previ usly detected in eger overflow. Finally, this SMT
constraint system will serve as confirma ion that the integer
o e flow can be removed if certain symbolic variables are
constrai ed in an appropriate way. Note hat these symb lic
variables have counterparts, which will be inserted when
ass mb ing the final code re air.
6) Determine Bug Type: The integer overflow checker
runs in parallel in our engine with other checkers (e.g., race
condition checker, buffer overflow checker, etc.), which are
currently available in our engine. Each bug checker generates
a report containing an unique bug identifier (i.e., time stamp
based + checker unique identifier) for each detected bug. Based
on the generated bug identifier, INTGUARD can determine
which bug type ❻ it currently deals with. This information
is extracted from the external data structures constructed at
step 2. With this information, INTGUARD checks in the list
of currently supported checkers to which checker this stored
identifies belongs to. Based on this information, INTGUARD
can determine which repair pattern can be used to repair the
previously detected integer overflow.
1if(leftHandSide.equals(
2rightHandSide)&&
3operator.equals("*")) {
4...
5return "if(sqrt("+leftHandSide
6+") <= sqrt(" + value4
7+") && -sqrt("+ rightHandSide
8+") >= -sqrt("+value5
9+"))"+"{"+"\n"+"\t"+"\t"+"\t"
10+buggyStm10 + "\n }else{ \n"
11
12//v.1: not used
13//+ "return;" + " }\n";
14
15//v.2: not used
16//+ "logg_IO_error(ID);"
17//+ " }\n";
18
19//Version 3: used
20+"FILE *fp=fopen (\"IO_"
21+"error_log.txt\", + \"w+\");"
22+"\n fprintf(fp, \"IO_ID:%s
23+FileName:%s LineNumber:%d",
24+FileName+","+IO_bug+","
25+LineNumber+");"
26+"\n fclose(fp);" + " }\n";
27}
Fig. 10: Code repair pattern.
7) Select Repair Pat-
tern: Based on the previ-
ous determined bug iden-
tifier (see ❻), INTGUARD
selects from the repair pat-
tern ❼ pool the repairs
suited for integer overflow
repair. INTGUARD repair
patterns consist of empty
C code skeletons (stubs)
where C statement parts
will be replaced with con-
crete values after their val-
ues have been computed
as presented in ❹ or with
other types of mathemat-
ical operations (e.g., di-
vision by a value). Also,
note that in some situ-
ations place holder vari-
ables will be replaced with
corresponding mathemati-
cal functions such as the square root function sqrt or other
functions. In these situations, INTGUARD does not compute
the value of the function upfront but rather leaves this to be
computed later during symbolic execution analysis or program
runtime. This offers the advantage that INTGUARD does not
need to be able to compute any possible mathematical function
before program runtime. Figure 10 depicts a code repair pattern
used by INTGUARD during integer overflow error repairing
(see generated repair in Figure 2). If not noted otherwise, each
code repair pattern contains C code compatible snippets (i.e.,
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Fig. 11: Code repair pattern.
The code repair patterns
used by INTGUARD con-
tain preco dition ch cks
which currently cover the
preconditions listed in sec-
tion §IV-C. Thes p e-
con iti ns cover multipli-
cation of numbers nd
ddition of variables. At
the same time the re-
pai patterns are highly
configurable and versatile.
Th programmer can eas-
ily change if needed for
example the error handling
function inside the repair
pattern or can extend the
precondition such that it
captures more c plex sit-
uations where for exam-
p multiple numbers are
added, multiplied, divided,
etc. This can be achieved by modifying a few lines of code
i side and existing p tern or by creating a ew ne and
defining the conditions (i.e., this depends on th s ructure of
the AST of the statement where the bug w s detected) when
such a pattern should be used.
INTGUARD follows the next steps in order to select the
repair pattern, which should be used for repairing a pre-
viously detected integer overflow. First, the code statement
where the integer overflow error was detected is divided
into its components based on his AST. For example the
AST components of a simple C statement like int result
= varA + varB; are: leftHandSide=varA, opera-
tor=+ and rightHandSide=varB. Second, a series of
rules are checked on the AST of the previous C state-
ment such as: (1) is leftHandSide equal/different than
rightHandSide, (2) what type of operator do we have
in the statement (i.e.,*), (3) how many components does the
statement have after the = sign, and so on. Third, based
on these rules the repair pattern which satisfies the highest
number of constraints will be selected. Note, that each repair
pattern has a list of properties (i.e., use when rightHand-
Side=leftHandSide and operator=+, etc.) attached to
it that are checked against the above stated rules. This list of
properties is statically defined when the repair patterns were
manually added to the pool of available repairs. Finally, in case
there are more repair patterns that fulfill the same number of
rules (i.e., rules match properties), INTGUARD selects the first
repair pattern occurring in the list. Note that if needed this
approach can be updated such that all legitimate repair patterns
will be proposed and for each a repair can be generated, and
selected with a human-in-the-loop approach.
For example, the repair pattern depicted in Figure 11 will
be used by INTGUARD when the leftHandSide equals (i.e.,
string wise comparison) with the rightHandSide and the
operator equals (i.e., string wise comparison) to the product
operator ∗ (see code lines 1-3 in Figure 11).
After the above checks have been performed the re-
pair will be assembled by following the next steps. First,
value4, value5 and buggyStm10, depicted in Figure 11
between code lines 5-10, are replaced with the follow-
ing. (1) the squared root of the currently selected inte-
ger upper bound value value4 ← sqrt(2147483647),
(2) the negated integer upper bound value value5 ← -
sqrt(2147483647), and (3) the program code statement
that contains the previously detected integer overflow er-
ror buggyStm10 ← int result = data * data;).
Second, the variables FileName, IO_ID and LineNumber
depicted in Figure 11 between code lines 23-24 are replaced
with concrete values obtained during bug detection.
Finally, note that: (1) other code repair patterns can be se-
lected and used based on the format of the AST of the program
statement where the integer overflow was detected upfront. (2)
our approach can be easily generalized to more complex C
code statements than the ones mentioned herein, and (3) each
generated repair can be easily customized to fit to different
types of integer overflow mitigation (i.e., error logging, calling
a handling function, see v.1 and v.2 in Figure 11).
8) Generate Code Repair: The final step ❽ consists in
putting together the final code repair and saving it in a list of
repair candidates for the previously detected integer overflow.
After all components have been inserted into the previously
selected code repair pattern in ❼, INTGUARD generates a C
code repair which is syntactically correct, can be compiled and
could be further on edited after insertion (if desired). Next
the assembled repair will be sent to the Eclipse LTK API
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based component of our engine, which will assemble the final
code repair. The steps performed in this component consist
in converting the code repair code into another representation
based on LTK node objects, which map to the translation unit
for the file in which we want to insert the repair. The LTK
component decides how to position the repair in the buggy
program such that the integer overflow will not occur after the
repair was inserted. The repair comes close to a guard around
the error prone code which forbids that an integer overflow
manifests during program runtime. Finally, the repair will be
passed to INTGUARDs repair insertion component, which will
create two differential views (i.e., with the repair inserted in
the file containing the bug and without).
E. Repair Location Search
In order to generate the code repair, INTGUARD needs to
detect the precise location where the integer overflow resides
in the program. Next, we will present the main steps of our
repair location search algorithm. First, each program execution
path is extracted from a previously computed CFG. Second,
the extracted path is traversed and path satisfiability checks
are performed at branch nodes. Third, when encountering
an integer error prone code location (i.e., assignment state-
ment) on the analyzed path, an integer overflow check is
performed by notifying the interpreter. Fourth, the notification
is delegated to the appropriate checker (i.e., integer overflow
checker) by the interpreter. Fifth, the slice of SMT equations
of the symbolic variable which overflowed is queried by the
integer overflow checker and corresponding integer overflow
satisfiability checks are added. Sixth, the check verifies if the
symbolic variable, which caused the integer overflow, can be
greater (i.e., if true then there is an integer overflow) than
the currently used integer upper bound value (i.e., INT_MAX).
These upper bound values are extracted from the C standard
library contained in the limits.h file. The lower bound is
obtained by negating the currently used upper bound value.
Finally, if the solver replies SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow
bug present) to the previously submitted SMT query, then a
problem report (i.e., problem ID (unique system string), file
name where the bug was detected and line number where the
bug is located) will be created and delivered. Finally, note
that in principle all other integer overflow related problems
(i.e., truncation, signedness) can be detected (and repaired) by
using our bug location search algorithm and repair generation
technique. Note, that only the type of error prone statement
(i.e., most likely code statements) and the additional checking
constraints which are added by each particular checker differ
w.r.t. integer- and underflow-overflow detection and repair.
F. Repair Insertion Support
Figure 12 depicts how INTGUARDS GUI support for repair
insertion looks like. First, the integer overflow checker which is
a sub-component of INTGUARD places a bug marker depicted
in Figure 12(black bordered box) with a yellow bug icon, on
the left of the C statement if at that particular code line an
integer overflow error was detected, see demo [26]. Second,
by right clicking on this bug marker the user can start the code
re-factoring wizard, see demo [27].
The code re-factoring wizard is composed of two windows.
The first window is used to make repair type decisions (cur-
Fig. 12: Bug detection and repair differential view.
rently only in-place repairs are available). The second window
depicted in Figure 12(in background) contains a differential
files view visualizing the differences between the original file
containing the bug and the modified file with the selected repair
inserted. Finally, it is possible to navigate between these two
windows and if wanted the repair generated in §IV-D can be
inserted by left click on the Finish button.
G. Testcase Based Repair Generation Support
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Fig. 13: Repair generation process.
Figure 13 depicts how INTGUARD can be used to repair
buggy programs with test case based support (i.e., jUnit). Note,
that INTGUARD can be used out of the box without test cases
as well. ❶, represents the analyzed C source code program,
❷, highlights the automated Eclipse jUnit test case generation,
❸, depicts the automated Eclipse C/C++ projects generation,
❹, indicates the loading of the Eclipse projects and jUnit
test cases, ❺, represents the running of the jUnit test cases,
❻, depicts the running of the integer overflow checker, ❼,
presents the static symbolic program analysis, ❽, depicts the
bug detection, ❾, indicates the bug report generation, and ❿,
highlights the repair generation steps (see section IV-D for
more details) for the previously generated report. The steps ❹
and ❺ run inside A (i.e., the Eclipse JDT IDE) and that ❻,
❼, ❽, ❾ and ❿ run inside B (i.e., the Eclipse CDT IDE). We
depicted A and B sequentially in Figure 13 since the Eclipse
JDT IDE triggers the start of the Eclipse CDT IDE. Note that
if desired the repair generation plug-in can be deployed into
the Eclipse CDT IDE such that the Eclipse JDT IDE becomes
superfluous. As a consequence, ❷, ❹ and ❺ become optional
and will not be used.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
INTGUARD. We implemented INTGUARD based on the
static analysis engine, which we developed as an Eclipse CDT
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IDE plug-in. We followed this approach since (1) the Eclipse
CDT API can be easily reused, (2) a GUI is easily obtainable,
and (3) the obtained tool can be used in online (i.e., during
code typing) and offline (i.e., after finishing code typing) mode.
For this purpose, we used Codan [32] in order to: (1) construct
the program CFG, (2) analyze AST of program statements,
and (3) perform bottom-up traversals by using a C program
statement visitor in order to construct SMT constraints.
Source Code Refactoring Tool. We implemented also a
graphical user interface (GUI) source code refactoring tool
used to aid the programmer during repair insertion based on
the Eclipse language tool kit (LTK), JFace and Eclipse CDT.
The tool provides useful features to the programmer in order
to take a more informed decision when inserting the previously
generated repair into the buggy program.
jUnit Test Case Generator Tool. We implemented a tool
to generate jUnit test cases for our tested programs in order
to effectively assess the effectiveness w.r.t. false positives and
false negatives of our tool. The tool generates the jUnit test
cases fully automatically after previously providing the path to
the test programs folder. The tool can automatically infer the
line number where the bug is located, the program function
containing the bug, and the class name. This information will
be used to parametrize a jUnit testing function which will be
used to asses if INTGUARD detected a true positive or false
positive.
Eclipse CDT Projects Generator Tool. We implemented
a tool in order to effectively assess our tool on any provided C
source code program. The tool requires for project generation:
(1) as input the path to the main folder where the files of the
program which we want to test are located, and (2) for each
generated project, two Eclipse CDT project files having the
file extensions .cproject and .project which will be
added to the project and updated with the names of the test
programs which we want to convert to Eclipse CDT projects.
The program generates new project by copying all the files
of the program which we want to analyze into an folder and
the aforementioned project files. Inside these files the name
of the project will be updated accordingly to the name of the
program which we want to analyze.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate the usefulness of our program repairs and
INTGUARDs scalability in general, we answer the following
research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: How effective is INTGUARD w.r.t. integer overflow
detection (§VI-A)?
• RQ2:What false/positives negatives ratio does INTGUARD
have (§VI-B)?
• RQ3: What is the repair generation overhead of INT-
GUARD (§VI-C)?
• RQ4: Is INTGUARD preserving intended program behavior
(§VI-D)?
• RQ5: Does INTGUARD scale to large programs (§VI-E)?
• RQ6: Does INTGUARD influence the program runtime
overhead (§VI-F)?
• RQ7: Does INTGUARD influence repaired program size
(§VI-G)?
• RQ8: How easy is the deployment of INTGUARD compared
to other tools (§VI-H)?
• RQ9: Which CRA types can INTGUARD help to avoid
(§VI-I)?
• RQ10: How does INTGUARD help during bug repair
(§VI-J)?
• RQ11: Is INTGUARD superior compared to other tools
(§VI-K)?
Preliminaries. Programs contained in the Juliet test suite
have: on average 476 LOC with a maximum of 638 LOC4, real
integer overflows, exactly one true positive and several false
negative integer overflows (see characteristics of [41]), and
many types of integer overflow related types. The analyzed
programs are available in the CWE-190, which is part of the
currently largest open source test suite for C/C++ code [41].
Additionally, we built a mini-benchmark containing programs
having from 6K LOC up to around 20K LOC in order to show
that INTGUARD scales to large and complex programs and that
it perfectly aligns with other static symbolic execution tools
(i.e., KLEE). Finally, we performed a controlled experiment
with 30 participants in which we assessed the efficiency of
INTGUARD during bug repairing.
Experimental Setup. We conducted the experiments on
a Dell desktop with an Intel CPU Q9550 @ 2.83GHz, 64-
bit, 12GB RAM, by running the Eclipse IDE v. Kepler SR1 in
OpenSUSE 13.1 OS. Similar to other symbolic execution tools,
all integer overflows reported by INTGUARD were manually
reviewed to decide if they were false positives/negatives, the
integer overflow bugs were really removed and if the inserted
repair would expose the program to other vulnerabilities.
IntGuard
Satisfiable Paths
IntGuard
Unsatisfiable Paths
IntGuard Program
Branch Nodes
IntGuard
Program Branches
115 K 1.2 Mil. 5.73 Mil. 12 Mil.
TABLE I: Analyzed programs characteristics.
Runtime Statistics. Table I depict several characteristics
of the 2052 analyzed programs contained in the SAMATE’s
Juliet test suite. In total 2052 C programs (977.7KLOC)
(Juliet test suite) and 10 program (our mini-benchmark) were
analyzed. The programs contained ≈115 K satisfiable paths,
1.2 million unsatisfiable program execution paths and in total
12 million program branches, which were counted during
programs analysis.
A. Effectiveness (RQ1)
We addressed the effectiveness of integer overflow detec-
tion by assessing the integer overflow detection rate in 2052
C programs. In order to be able to insert a repair, the precise
source code location has to be determined upfront. First, we
generated automatically 2052 Eclipse CDT compatible projects
(i.e., for each test program a project) with the help of our tool
described in §V. The Eclipse CDT projects were generated
to be able to analyze the test programs with the help of the
Eclipse CDT API. Second, we generated automatically 2052
4The largest is CWE190_Integer_Overflow_int_listen_socket_multiply_15.
We added the utility files contained in [41] for each of the generated projects
such that the code becomes compilable.
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jUnit test cases (i.e., for each test program a jUnit test case),
which were used to assess if the detected integer overflow
errors were detected at the right source code location. Finally,
we evaluated the jUnit reports manually and cross-checked the
locations of each of the detected integer overflow bug report
icons. We can confirm that INTGUARD has achieved 100%
detection rate, i.e., from the total number of integer overflow
errors, INTGUARD was able to detect all.
B. False Positives and False Negatives (RQ2)
We addressed the false positives and false negatives de-
tection rates in order to assess the potential impact of repair-
ing false alerts. As already mentioned, our integer overflow
detection analysis is conservative, and thus our analysis is
sound (i.e., see our soundness definition in §I). In other words,
any detected vulnerability, which satisfies the integer overflow
characteristics (i.e., can be confirmed by the Z3 solver) will
be successfully detected and reported by INTGUARD.
We evaluated the false positive rate of INTGUARD, by run-
ning the previously generated jUnit test cases on all programs
and assessed the rate of false positives and false negatives
by checking each generated jUnit report. The jUnit reports
confirmed by comparing the previously stored during jUnit
testcase generation of the program specific information (i.e.,
line number and file name where the true positive is located)
that each detected integer overflow was located at the expected
location (i.e., line number and file name). Additionally, we
manually checked each report in order to see if there are false
positive or false negatives. After evaluating the results, we can
confirm that we did not encounter any false positives or false
negatives.
In case INTGUARD would repair false positives then: (1)
unwanted program behavior would be inserted, (2) the repair
would be no longer sound, (3) we would not be sure if integer
underflows are avoided, and (4) by repairing a false positive
the repair would be useless.
However, we are aware that by running INTGUARD on real
software we could encounter false positives due to the fact that
100% path coverage is currently not achievable in practice for
all types of programs. In fact, our symbolic analysis is context-
sensitive, with high path coverage. But, nevertheless, infeasible
paths due to loop unrolling may result in false positives. The
conservative symbolic analysis could also add false positives
due to possible analysis imprecision (e.g., due to the used
environment functions). One possible solution is the use of
concolic execution, which has the potential to further reduce
imprecision due to not using environment functions and loop
invariants that are well known sources of imprecision.
C. Computational Overhead (RQ3)
We assessed the computational overhead of generating
program repairs by comparing against the runtime needed
to detect the integer overflow error. The runtime needed by
INTGUARD to detect 2052 integer overflow errors was around
3942 seconds (around 3 hours) and the time needed to generate
the repairs was 47 seconds. This corresponds to a computa-
tional overhead of around 1% (i.e., 3942/47 = 83.87 seconds
≈1%), which is in our opinion quite low w.r.t. the integer
overflow error detection time. In addition, the repairs are
useful and in many aspects superior to manually or compiler
generated repairs.
D. Preserving Program Behavior (RQ4)
We addressed whether program behavior is preserved by
running INTGUARD on all programs and by repairing all
detected integer overflows. Thereafter, we automatically com-
pared the output log of each program against the previous log
of the unrepaired program by using the same program input.
We did not observe any program execution deviation from the
previous output log; just the log-line mentioning that an integer
overflow bug could manifest was not present in the log of the
repaired programs.
Next, we manually analyzed all source code locations
where repairs were inserted and noticed that all insertion
locations were correct locations which were previously spec-
ified in the jUnit test case. Thus, for all programs the errors
were successfully removed by inserting the repair at the
corresponding location.
Furthermore, after applying the repair we ran the analysis
again on each of the programs in order to see if there is a
potential new integer overflow error or the old one is still
present in the repaired program. We also recompiled each of
the programs to investigate if the repaired program is com-
pilable and thus syntactically correct. We manually inspected
all problem reports generated for each of the detected and
repaired integer overflow bugs, and we could not detect any
new integer overflow errors for other locations in the already
repaired programs. Finally, we can confirm that the behavior
of the repaired programs did not change after applying the
repairs.
E. Benchmark Correctness Evaluation (RQ5)
The structural complexity of C/C++ programs makes it
hard to assess the correctness of symbolic execution based
tools against each other. Thus, we propose a custom-build
micro-benchmark to prove the correct detection and repair of
integer overflows with our tool and any other future integer
overflow repair tools. The micro-benchmark contains several
programs ranging from ≈6K to ≈20 LOC. Note that the
number of LOC of our programs are comparable with the LOC
of popular software such as GNU Coreutils (15,065 LOC), and
bzip2 (5,823 LOC). Also, each benchmark program contains
exactly one seeded true positive integer overflow and a variable
number of false positive integer overflows.
The goal of the micro-benchmark is to cover complex
control flow scenarios including a large number of branches
and symbolic variables, with the main objective of correctly
assessing the seeded integer overflows. We designed the micro-
benchmark to cover multiple paths with variable length based
on the following considerations. First, the total number of
function calls inside the micro-benchmark is parameterizable.
Second, the number of loop iterations is also parameterizable.
Third, each generated program contains exactly one true posi-
tive and a variable number of false positives. Finally, the true
positive is located deep inside the program; several thousand
of branches nested inside the program execution tree w.r.t. the
root node of the tree.
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Using these limits, we generated several programs and
included each of these programs in multiple source files. These
program files make up our micro-benchmark, which we will
use to evaluate the correctness and precision of our integer
overflow detection tool.
We evaluate our micro-benchmark w.r.t. (1) time needed
to run the analysis on the programs, and (2) false positive
and true positive rates. The precision of detection is evaluated
by manually inspecting the reports generated by our tool and
deciding if the report belongs to a true positive or not. The
time needed to detect the true positive inside a program is
computed by our tool and it is based on the difference between
bug detection time and the start of the program analysis time.
6 KLOC Programs 11 KLOC Programs 20 KLOC Programs
46 seconds 151 seconds 567 seconds
TABLE II: Average analysis time in seconds over 10 runs.
Table II depicts the average static analysis runtimes over 10
runs for each of the mini-benchmark programs grouped in three
main categories based on their LOC. INTGUARD was able
to detect and repair all true positives present in the analyzed
programs without repairing any false positives.
While most of the static analysis tools aim for detecting
of a few true positives with relative high percentage of false
positives we aim to have as few false positive as possible and
as many true positives as possible.
We used cppcheck (also we considered Sift which is how-
ever not open source) on our micro-benchmark, which was not
able to detect any of the inserted integer overflows. INTGUARD
was able to detect all inserted integer overflows with no
false positives generated. Further, we found our benchmark
extremely valuable during the implementation phase of our
tool to detect corner cases of possible true positives.
As we are not aware of any currently available integer
overflow tool which performs a systematic assessment of
its repair rate on a seeded benchmark (containing large and
complex programs) with integer overflows, we propose that
our benchmarks or a similar one should be used broadly such
that tools can be coherently compared against each other. This
will assure that new techniques can be easily evaluated against
existing techniques and this further helps to push the bar
towards more useful and sound tools. To faciliate these goals,
we will release our micro-benchmark as open source.
F. Runtime Performance Overhead (RQ6)
We evaluated the runtime performance overhead by running
INTGUARD on all programs and by repairing all encountered
integer overflow errors. We compared the runtime of the
unrepaired programs with the repaired programs and noticed
on average around 1% runtime overhead.
The obtained runtime overhead is quite low since the tested
programs have rather low complexity and the bugs do usually
not reside in hot code. Thus, the inserted repairs do not
considerably influence the runtime overhead of the repaired
program. We are aware that for more complex applications the
runtime overhead can be substantially larger as a result of the
program repairs, when these reside, for example, in hot code
(i.e., recursive calls). However, the repairs have higher priority
than leaving them out, and such integer overflow errors should
not be tolerated by programmers.
G. Source Code and Binary Blowup (RQ7)
We assessed the source code and binary blowup by count-
ing the increase in source code lines and in bytes for the
resulted program binaries before and after applying the repairs.
First, we compared the total line count of the source code
against the number of lines of code which were added after in-
serting all the repairs into the programs. As already mentioned,
the initial line count was 977.7KLOC. After applying all
repairs we added in total around 10 KLOC. This corresponds
to an increase of less than 2% in LOC and represents in our
opinion a tolerable source code increase. Note that no code
lines were deleted or compacted after applying the repair.
Second, we compared the size in bytes of the original program
binary and the program binary after applying the repairs. The
original size of all 2052 vulnerable programs is 1922.8 Mb.
After applying all repairs to the programs, we noticed no
binary size increase. This is because we add a rather small
number of checks per program. Thus, we confirm that the
size of each program binary did not increase more than 1%.
This makes INREP highly effective and usable in, for example,
embedded scenarios where minimizing program binary size is
a key objective.
H. Deployment (RQ8)
As one of the main design goals of INTGUARD is au-
tomatic deployment, we describe our experience of applying
INTGUARD to the 2052 C programs. INTGUARD was able to
successfully repair and recompile the 2052 C programs without
any crashes. At the same time, we were able to repair all
detected integer overflow errors.
In contrast, CIntFix was not able to analyze all 2052
programs (i.e., only 1938 programs) since CIntFix could not
deal with programs which depend heavily on I/O (input/output)
and thus the authors claim that these programs are unsuitable
for automatic evaluation. Also, CIntFix performs less informed
program repairs than INTGUARD because the repair generation
and insertion do not rely on a previous integer overflow error
detection step, which usually helps to confirm that the integer
overflow error is present in the program at a particular source
code line. Further, CIntFix is a runtime based tool which incurs
a rather high performance overhead (i.e., 16% in average)
when tested on the same programs as INTGUARD which has
around 1% runtime performance overhead. Finally, CINTFIX
does not provide any GUI which could aid the programmer to
more easily locate the source code line where a repair will be
inserted (aided by a report created for each integer overflow).
I. Security Analysis (RQ8)
Table III stems from NVD [59] and presents a brief analysis
of arbitrary code executions, which are caused by exploitable
integer overflows. Next to the corresponding CVE number/type
and the repairs used to fix the reported integer overflow
vulnerability, we highlight the fact that most of the exploitable
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CVE Number Application Heap Cor-
ruption
Stack Cor-
ruption
Local Remote Patch Avoidable
CVE-2017-797 Ghostscript X X [49] X
CVE-2016-10164 libXpm 3.5.12 X X [50] X
CVE-2016-8706 Memcached 1.4.31 X X [51] X
CVE-2016-9427 bdwgc X X [52] X
CVE-2014-9862 bsdiff, in Mac OS X X X [53] X
TABLE III: Avoidable vulnerabilities by using INTGUARD.
integer overflow vulnerabilities, which lead to arbitrary code
executions, are heap-based which is also confirmed in Figure 1.
We analyzed the used repairs (see Table III) and made
several observation w.r.t. the repairs: (1) they are relatively
small (up to 5 LOC), (2) they consist of changing the wrong
data type used for declaring an integer to the right data type,
and (3) they introduce some simple bounds or a cascade of
bound checks on the integer value before using it in an unsafe
program location where for example user input in form of files
(or other forms of input) is used by the program as parameters.
Another observation is that the integer overflows are not spread
over a large context (only 1-2 files) and appear to have no
complex dependencies, which would cause difficulties for any
static program analysis technique.
Furthermore, based on these observations we think that
some of the previously depicted memory corruptions can be
avoided if INTGUARD is used consistently by programmers
in their daily routines. We make this claim based on the
fact that the repairs introduced by INTGUARD are specifically
addressing the above observations, namely (1) the repairs
check if the data type of the integer could overflow and
cause an error, (2) the repairs are automatically adaptable
in order to generate complex range checks (which can cover
complex checks), and (3) INTGUARD can be used as a point-
wise program repair insertion tool which means that it can
generate complex repairs that for humans are difficult to
generate by relying on a fast local context program analysis.
Finally, we want to emphasize that INTGUARD can also protect
against other types of vulnerabilities (i.e., buffer overflows) and
attacks (i.e., CRAs, DoS), which are based on integer overflow
vulnerabilities by extending its integer overflow types detection
capabilities.
J. Controlled Experiment (RQ10)
Setup. We performed a controlled experiment by asking
30 graduate students (16 male and 14 female) with 1-2
years programming experience to assess INTGUARD during
a bug bounty experiment. We split the 30 participants in
two groups. The number of females and males was split
evenly between the two groups. We randomly selected three
programs contained in our mini-benchmark. We did not tell
the participants which type of bug to look for and how many
he/she should detect and repair. The computer used in our
experiment was equipped with two versions of Eclipse CDT
(i.e., one Eclipse version with INTGUARD installed and the
other Eclipse version without INTGUARD installed). Before
the experiment was started we asked each of the participants
to notify the person overlooking the experiment when a repair
was inserted and he/she has finished his/her analysis for time
keeping reasons. Next, we informed each participant from each
group to find the bugs in the three given programs and repair
them.
Experiment. The experiment was conducted with each
participant individually placed at a single PC with an additional
person in the room who overlooked the experiment.
Group 1. Each participant had access to the most recent
Eclipse CDT IDE and to the GCC (v. 4.9.3) compiler through
terminal access. Next, we asked the participants to search for
bugs and fix them with the help of the Eclipse CDT IDE where
INTGUARD was not installed.
Group 2. Before the experiment, each participant from the
second group got a short one minute demo movie showing
them how to use INTGUARD. Next, we asked the participants
to search for bugs and fix them with the help of the Eclipse
CDT IDE were INTGUARD was installed.
We measured the time needed for each participant to locate
the bug and repair it as well as the success rate for each
analyzed program after the participant decided that he was
finished. After the experiment, we asked each participant if
(1) he/she would reuse our tool in his/her daily routine and if
(2) he/she would recommend it to other peers. Each question
should be answered with yes/no.
Results. In total, the participants needed more than 18
times (6534 vs. 362 seconds) more time to repair the pro-
grams without INTGUARD than with it. From the 98 program
repairs introduced manually 61% were correct (i.e., the integer
overflow bug was removed and no new vulnerability was
introduced). We assessed this through manual inspection of
the repairs inserted by each participant after he/she left the
experiment room. In contrast, each participant which used
INTGUARD could remove all bugs successfully. From, the
total of 30 participants 90% (27 participants) found the tool
useful and 83.3% (25 participants) would further recommend
INTGUARD to their peers. Overall, the results show that the
time needed to find and repair an integer overflow manually
is substantially higher than with the help of INTGUARD,
and at the same time working without INTGUARD led to a
comparatively low rate of correct repairs.
K. Comparison with Other Tools (RQ11)
First, we analyzed the 2052 C programs with cp-
pcheck [25]. The tool reported 2592 format strings warnings
(i.e., %u in format string (no. 1) requires ’unsigned int’ but
the argument type is ’size_t aka unsigned long), 0 errors, 1524
style issues, 1467 performance issues, 1344 portability issues
(i.e., scanf without field width limits can crash with huge input
data on some versions of libc), and 1 information issue (i.e.,
Cppcheck cannot find all the include files). Second, we ana-
lyzed the 2052 C programs with the Coverity [66] open source
static analysis tool. The reports generated for the analyzed
programs indicated several possible integer overflows, but no
integer overflow repairs were suggested. Third, we compiled
all programs, which we analyzed, with all warnings that GCC
(v. 4.9.3) has to offer. We parsed all the logs generated and
observed that neither any integer overflow reports nor source
code repairs were suggested. Fourth, we compiled all 2052
programs with all warning flags on with Clang (v. 3.8.0).
We parsed all log outputs and observed no integer overflows
repair suggestions. Even though the warnings for Clang are
more expressive than those of GCC, we did not observe
any suggestion on how to repair the compiled programs. In
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summary, we can confirm that all tools, which we used in our
evaluation, are not able to suggest any code repairs that can
be used to avoid the integer overflows present in the analyzed
programs.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we compare in §VII-A INTGUARD with
other runtime tools, and in §VII-B we present some limitations
of INTGUARD.
A. Comparison with other Tools
1) Source Code Based Tools: CIntFix [11] is a runtime
based tool used for repairing of integer related problems in C
source code functions. This tool utilizes integers of infinite
size with two’s complement encoding in place of original
bounded integers. However, CIntFix cannot automatically infer
constraints on arguments of library function without previously
provided code annotations. CIntFix is unable to tolerate inten-
tional wraparounds which directly propagate to critical sites.
Thus, CIntFix was not able to analyze all 2052 programs since
CIntFix can not deal with programs which depend heavily on
I/O. Furthermore, CIntFix does not rely on integer overflow
repair as INTGUARD does, thus it naïvely inserts repairs at
all possible source code locations, even at the ones where no
integer overflow can occur at all. In contrast, INTGUARD has≈
1% overhead compared to CIntFix (i.e., 16% is low). CIntFix
has a high source code expansion of 25% while INTGUARD
has ≈ 2% source code expansion due to the fact that the repairs
inserted by INTGUARD are inserted more informed. Finally,
CIntFix does not have any GUI support during repair insertion
which can be a considerable advantage in some situations.
2) Program Binary Based Tools: TAP [56] is a runtime
based tool which operates directly on x86 binaries. It is the
most similar tool to INTGUARD since both tools first detect an
integer overflow and next they generate a code repair which
removes the integer overflow. TAP’s integer overflow discovery
algorithm is based on Diode [55]. TAP needs access to the
program’s source code in order to insert the generated repair.
TAP monitors the execution of the application to identify
memory allocation sites and construct symbolic expressions
that capture the size of the allocated buffer as a function
of the input bytes. It then uses goal-directed conditional
branch enforcement to generate inputs that (1) overflow the
computation of the size of the allocated buffer while (2) forcing
the application to take a path that executes the statement at
the memory allocation site. Repair generation is based on
templates that are matched against a previously generated
symbolic expressions. If a template matches, TAP applies the
template to generate an associated patch and inserts the patch
into the application. Compared to INTGUARD, TAP relies on
seed inputs which if not available limit the usability of TAP.
Also, TAP checks that the integer overflow error was removed
with a limited set of input seeds which do not guarantee that
the error was really removed from the program binary. Finally,
we note that the number of repair guarantees offered by TAP
fulfill less guarantees than and thus are less safe as those
offered by INTGUARD.
B. Limitations
First, our evaluation is based on the currently largest open
source test suite for C/C++ programs. Thus, the findings of
this evaluation still do not necessarily reflect the behavior of
INTGUARD when applied to larger programs. However, we
think that this does not limit the applicability of INTGUARD
since our tool is highly scalable due to its configurable analysis
and the potential for implementation of fuzzing techniques
which make our tool even more effective.
Second, the implementation of INTGUARD depends on
loop unrolling which incurs well known precision penalties.
This insufficiency can be addressed in some cases by a prior
analysis of program loops in order to derive loop invariants
and in cases where this is not statically determinable symbolic
analysis could switch to concolic analysis. Our static analysis
is time-consuming. Its accuracy and performance will affect
INTGUARD results. Furthermore, environment functions pro-
vided by the programmers are needed.
Third, another potential limitation for certain programers
is the fact that INTGUARD is developed as a plug-in and runs
inside Eclipse CDT. This could be annoying to some program-
mers used to command line tools. Nevertheless, this can be
easily addressed by exporting INTGUARD as a command line
tool similar to CIntFix [11] which relies as INTGUARD on the
Eclipse CDT framework as well.
Fourth, at this stage of development our static analysis
engine can build the control flow graph of the program and
analyze a subset of the C/C++ programming languages. This
means that only certain types of statement and functions
headers can be understood by our engine. This limitation can
be eliminated by working the complete list of C/C++ statement
types and function headers. This can be solved in future by
investing sufficient time and manpower.
Finally, we tested INTGUARD in a controlled experiment
with a restricted number of participants and for this reason
our findings will do not necessarily scale in industrial settings
were real development conditions are available. Nevertheless,
we think that our tool can help to drastically cut down the time
needed for bug finding an repair due to its usability and low
intrusiveness.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Integer overflows have threatened software programs for
decades. The usage of different types of tools based on:
static analysis integer overflow detection [35, 55, 62], runtime
program repair [2], benign integer overflow identification [62],
directed and random fuzzing [30, 61], concolic testing [7],
library support and runtime checks [47, 48], and repair code
transfer [57] have helped to reduce the number of integer
overflows. These tools have seen only little to no adoption
in the industry; partly because their benefits are hard to assess
in the context of real software projects [45] where there is
an urgent need to detect and avoid integer overflow based
memory corruptions, which can lead to CRAs [4] or other
security vulnerabilities [60, 62].
Table IV summarizes a string of tools used for integer
overflow detection and repair, and the underlying techniques
on which these tools are based. In Table IV the • symbol means
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ARCHER [10] • • • • • • • •
UQBTng [64] • • • • • • •
PREfast [36] • • • • • • • •
Rich [3] • • • • • • • • • • •
SAGE [29] • • • • • • • • •
IntScope[60] • • • • • •
Brick [8] • • • • • • • •
IntFinder [9] • • • • • • • •
SmartFuzz [37] • • • • • • • • • •
PREfix [38] • • • • • • • •
IntPatch [69] • • • • • • •
IOC [23] • • • • • • • • • •
IntFlow [44] • • • • • • • • • •
SoupInt [63] • • • • • • •
SIFT [35] • • • • • • • •
TAP [56] • • • • • • • • • • •
Diode [55] • • • • •
Indio [68] • • • • • •
Zhang et al. [70] • • • • •
IntEQ [58] • • • • • • • • • • • •
CIntFix [11] • • • • • • • • • •
IntGuard • • • • • • • • •
TABLE IV: Integer overflow detection and repair features.
addressed and the abbreviations have the following meaning:
static symbolic detection (s. s. d.), dynamic symbolic detection
(d. s. d), and ¬ logical not. We deliberately excluded from
Table IV commercial static symbolic execution tools (e.g.,
CodeSonar; see [20] for more details), which scale to programs
having millions LOC and which can efficiently detect integer
overflows, since their internals are mostly unknown.
It is interesting to note that most of these tools are either
only used for integer overflow detection or if they are used
for code repair then they do not consider detecting first the
integer overflow. More specifically, INTGUARD and TAP are
the only tools which first detect the integer overflow and than
propose a repair for it. Additionally, most of the other repair
generation tools are repairing the programs in an uninformed
(i.e., without first detecting and classifying the bug) manner,
which consequently incurs high runtime overhead and signif-
icant insertion imprecision. Further, only SIFT is based on a
sound technique, and none of the other tools are complete for
well known reasons—discussing all these reasons here is out of
scope of this paper. In contrast, INTGUARD code repairs are
sound (e.g., no false positives, see our soundness definition
in §I). Please note that comparing all the tools depicted in
Table IV against INTGUARD in detail is not feasible within
the page length constraints of this paper. Thus, next we briefly
mention several integer overflow repair generation tools and
relate them to INTGUARD.
1) Source Code Repairs: CIntFix [11] is a runtime based
tool used for protection against integer related problems in
C source code functions only. This tool utilizes integers
of infinite size with two’s complement encoding in place
of original bounded integers. The code transformations of
CIntFix can be only applied to complete functions and the
analysis is not inter-procedural. Further, the runtime slowdown
is around 18%. CIntFix has several advantages. The analysis
performed by CIntFix is syntax-directed and rule-based, which
avoids sophisticated and imprecise analysis. Its analysis cannot
scale to large programs and CIntFix can miss the repair of
some integer overflows as well. CIntFix is unable to tolerate
intentional wraparounds, which directly propagate to critical
sites. From the total of 2052 programs in CWE190, it could
repair only 1938 (114 misses), whereas INTGUARD could
fix all of them. Also, the source code expansion is above
25%, which is ≈25 times more than the code expansion of
INTGUARD. The runtime on the repaired programs is 16%,
whereas INTGUARD slowdown on the same programs is ≈1%.
CIntFix claims to provide transformation, which are safe,
but this is currently hard to assess since its transformations
and the ones of AIC/CIT/RAO [74] are very similar and the
transformations of the later do not preserve program behavior.
AIC/CIT/RAO [74] is a static source code analysis tool
built as an Eclipse plug-in, which provides several code trans-
formations that can be used to avoid integer overflows. The
provided transformations are similar to code refactorings, but
actually transform the internal model of a C program towards a
safe model. This tool provides three types of transformations:
add integer cast (AIC), replace arithmetic operator (RAO), and
change integer type (CIT). Based on these three safe code
transformations, this tool can protect against integer overflows
without the need to detect the integer overflow first. In contrast,
INTGUARD first detects the integer overflow using symbolic
static analysis and then it generates a repair, which can protect
against the integer overflow and underflow. The above three
transformations can not be applied to all unsafe situations
and a fraction of the variable declarations are also modified
since in some situations the preconditions which have to be
checked are far to complex than what AIC/CIT/RAO can
cover. In this situation no transformations are applied. The
tool has an runtime overhead of the hardened programs which
is over 30% which in real software is not acceptable. The
AIC/CIT/RAO transformations do not preserve the original
program behavior as mentioned in the original paper. The
goal of these transformations is to transform the program to
a more safe integer model. The CIT transformation suffers
from the need of justification of a type change. Finally, the
repairs cannot be considered user-friendly resulting often in
complex cascaded transformations, which are hard to assess
by a programmer.
2) Binary-Based Repairs: Sift [35] is a binary based which
can protect programs against integer overflows by instrument-
ing its binary. Sift relies on carefully crafted user source
code annotations in order to identify the input field that
each input statement reads. The tool can not generate input
filters for all types of source code sites (i.e., currently only
memory allocations and block memory copy sites). In contrast,
INTGUARD does not rely on source code annotations. Note
that the integer overflow triggering file input formats are all
image based (i.e., PNG, JPEG, GIF, SWF) or sound (i.e.,
WAV) based. Particularly, when expressions at a site contain
subexpressions whose values depend on an unbounded number
of values computed in loops the tool needs an upper bound on
the number of loop iterations which can be specified by the
programer upfront (i.e., currently not used by the tool). INT-
GUARD takes a different approach by statically unrolling each
loop 10 times. Sift produced no false positives by applying 62K
inputs to the previous repaired programs. These still does not
mean that the tool cannot produce false positives. In order to
filter out an integer overflow a potentially infinite input set has
to be applied to the program in order to be 100% sure that there
is no false positive. In contrast, INTGUARD does not rely on
any input integer overflow triggering files which arguably in for
some types of programs are much more harder to be generated
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by Sift (i.e., configuration files for web servers, etc.). Further,
Sift may introduce unwanted program behavior since it does
not first detect the integer overflow but rather it generates an
input filter for the previously annotated integer overflow prone
source code site. In contrast INTGUARD detects first the integer
overflow and than it proposes a repair for it which further is not
naïvely inserted since the final insertion decision is delegated
to the programmer. TAP [56] is yet another runtime based tool
used for repairing C programs by operating on x86 program
binaries. TAP is similar to INTGUARD w.r.t. the fact that both
tools first detect an integer overflow and next they generate a
code repair which removes the integer overflow. TAP utilizes
the integer overflow discovery algorithm from Diode [55] and
needs access to both source code and the binary in order to
insert the generated repairs in the program binary. It checks
that the integer overflow error was removed with a limited set
of input seeds which do not guarantee that the error was really
removed from the program binary since the set of provided
inputs is limited.
3) Transferring Code Repairs: This techniques assume that
several applications which run on multiple input files and
an input file which triggers an error in one application can
be used (for example CodePhage [57]) to find checks in
other applications that enable other applications to successfully
process the input file. Next, it relies on multi-application code
transfer to transfer these checks into the original application
and eliminate the error. INTGUARD differs in that its code
repair technique enable it to generate repairs in the absence
of any applications that need to process the same inputs and
the checks do not have to be somewhere else present in
the application but rather these are completely automatically
generated.
4) Static Integer Errors Detection: Several static analysis
tools have been proposed to address integer related problems.
Diode [55] relies on targeted site identification and goal-
directed conditional branch enforcement in order to discover
integer overflow errors in x86 binaries. Compared to our tool
Diode does not exercise all bugs due to a limited number of
test inputs. Similarly, SIFT [35] uses a sound static program
analysis in order to generate filters that remove inputs that may
trigger overflow errors and it is not intended to be used for inte-
ger overflow error identification. In contrast, INTGUARD does
not rely on carefully crafted inputs and is intended to be used
for integer overflow error detection and repair. KINT requires
optionally procedure specifications from the programmer in
order to characterize parameter value ranges and it reports
many false positives [62]. In contrast, INTGUARD analysis
proves the existence of integer overflow errors without any
false negatives on the evaluated programs.
5) Benign Integer Overflows: Sometimes code contains
benign IOs [62]. A possible concern is that the integer overflow
repair tools may interfere with the behavior of such programs.
Because INTGUARD focuses primarily on critical assignments
sites (i.e., other types can be also supported) that are mostly
unlikely to contain such intentional IOs, it is unlikely to
remove benign IOs and therefore to interfere with the intended
program behavior.
6) Directed and Random Fuzzing: Taking a different ap-
proach, fuzzing-based software testing is used by large com-
panies, but suffers from well known limitations including a
lack of usability of the randomly generated seed input set and
the fact that the code repair is still left as a tedious and error-
prone manual task for the programmer. An example is Google’s
OSS-Fuzz [6], which uses this technique for bug detection,
but does not provide repairs. Directed fuzzing [61, 30] main
goal is to expose errors which reside deep inside programs.
BuzzFuzz [30] and TaintScope [61] use taint tracking to
identify input bytes that influence values at critical program
sites such as memory allocation sites and system calls. These
tools are successful at reducing the size of the fuzzed input
but in general are inefficient at finding carefully crafted inputs
used to expose integer overflow errors. Because these directed
fuzzing tools operate on raw binary input, the changes in the
input can produce syntactically incorrect input that fail the
sanity checks. Another technique is based on random fuzzing
which is successfully used by security researchers [43]. Due
to the fact that its generated inputs fail input checks, random
fuzzing is relatively ineffective for example at generating
inputs that trigger integer overflow errors.
7) Concolic Testing: Concolic testing is a newer alternative
than directed and random fuzzing [7]. These tools execute
programs both concretely and symbolically on a seed input
until an interesting program expression is reached. Although
successful in many scenarios [7], concolic testing faces several
challenges [54]. Specifically, the resulted constraint systems
for deeper program paths get very complex and thus beyond
the capabilities of current SMT solvers. SmartFuzz [37] is a
concolic testing tool which can detect IO, non-value-preserving
width conversions, and potentially dangerous signed/unsigned
conversions. Furthermore it is limited by deep program paths
and blocking checks. Dowser [31] is a fuzzer that combines
taint tracking, program analysis, and symbolic execution to
find buffer overflows. These tools are optimized for path cov-
erage and therefore it is unlikely to discover integer overflow
errors. TAP uses the algorithms of DIODE [55] to detect
integer overflow errors. DIODE compared to other similar tools
is targeted. It starts with a critical site that is executed by a
seed input. A range of techniques are used in order to navigate
sanity and blocking checks to trigger an overflow at the critical
site.
8) Library Support and Runtime Checks: Safe integer li-
braries such as, SafeInt [48] or IntegerLib [47], are widely used
during runtime. These approaches impose on the programmers
that they rewrite existing code to use safe integer operations.
INTGUARD, in contrast, detects and repairs integer overflow
errors without any assistance from developers to rewrite code.
Another wide used approach to address the problem of false
positives is based on runtime detection tools that dynamically
insert runtime checks before integer related operations [3].
One major drawback of the inserted checks is that these incur
often time a high runtime overhead. In contrast, INTGUARD
inserts checks only when it previously found an IO. It therefore
imposes a low performance overhead. Other tools such as
IOC [23], IntPatch [69] and IntEQ [58] add runtime checks
statically by using compiler instrumentation in order to check
for integer overflow errors during runtime when more context
is available. Input rectification [34] is another approach which
modifies program inputs that crash an application such that it
will not crash afterwards. Because it learns needed constraints
that the input has to satisfy these technique is susceptible to
false positives.
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IX. FUTURE WORK
In this section we mention briefly several avenues for
improving INTGUARD in future work.
A. Guided Program Path Exploration
For example all kind of guided symbolic execution tech-
niques help to guide the symbolic analysis to more interesting
program locations by skyping those program locations which
are less prone to contain integer overflow errors. Such tech-
niques have been widely used in the past with more or less
success. One typical characteristic from which INTREP could
also benefit is the discovery of deep integer overflow errors
which usually could not be exercised since there are located
deep in the program.
B. Program Path Pruning Techniques
Further, we want to implement several path pruning tech-
niques in order to run INTREP on larger programs. These
techniques can be beneficial to INTREP in many ways. First,
several light-weight path exploration techniques such as DFS,
BFS can be implemented in order to better quide the analysis.
Second, we want to combine the previous mentioned path
exploration techniques with path merging techniques based on
dead variables or interpolation which further help to reduce
the search space. We are aware that those techniques will not
overcome the path explosion problem and as such full path
coverage is rather a mythical thing to attain. On the other hand,
we strongly believe that the main benefit of this research paths
would be the detection of previously unknown integer overflow
errors which would make the effort worthwhile.
C. Other Reparable Error Types
All types (e.g., signedness, etc.) of integer related errors,
which CIntFix can repair, can be also detected and repaired
by INTREP in principle. The main step towards this goal is to
extend the set of possible checked locations for integer related
problems. Furthermore, we want to address the repair of other
types of integer related problems (e.g., underflow, signedness,
truncation, intentional, unintentional and undefined) which can
lead to CRAs as well.
D. Extending to C++ programs
Currently our program statement translation component is
under construction and we plan in future to be able to scale
to the C++ language as well in order to be able to cover all
possible language semantics. Additionally, we think that this is
just a matter of time and manpower which has to be invested
in order to achieve this goal.
E. Caching Techniques
We want to explore how to efficiently run the integer
overflow detection and repair tool in online mode such that
program related information can be cached and reused for
repair generation when the program number of code lines
increases over time. This can be achieved efficiently by using
the information which version control systems provide.
F. Industry Acceptance
In the future, we want to test INTREP in real industrial
scenarios. Most of the successfully used tools for error de-
tection in the industry (i.e., at Google) are mainly based on
fuzzers. These tools have proven to be effective and scalable
to large code bases and their success rate depends heavily on
the search heuristic behind the technique. Moreover, we think
that static analysis tools should be more used by programmers
and such tools should be particularly tailored (i.e., integrated
with build and/or version control tools) for their needs in order
to find acceptance. Thus, there is a still long way to go but
we are confident that these tools will find wide acceptance and
replace fuzzing only based techniques since their accuracy and
effectiveness is superior to the previous mentioned tools.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented INTGUARD, an integer overflow
detection and repair tool for C source code, which provides
sound, highly useful and high-quality code repairs that satisfy
more repair guarantees than other state-of-the-art tools.
In our evaluation, we applied INTGUARD to C programs
having ≈1 Mil. LOC. Experimental results show that INT-
GUARD’S repairs are more effective (i.e., repaired programs
have around 1% runtime overhead), precise (i.e., no false
positives are repaired), and more useful (i.e., sound repairs)
than other state-of-the-art tools. INTGUARD was able to repair
integer overflows using automatically generated source code
repairs that incurred less than 2% increase in LOC and around
1% program binary blow-up. We conducted a controlled ex-
periment with 30 participants in which we showed that INT-
GUARD is 18 times more time-effective and has a higher repair
success rate than manual repairs. At the same time, 91% of the
participants found INTGUARD highly usable and 83% of the
participants would further recommend it to their peers. Finally,
we point out that in order to protect against CRAs and other
types of integer overflow based vulnerabilities a promising
approach is to check the program source code in a consistent
fashion as part of programmers’ daily routine; INTGUARD
can address this goal in an efficient and programmer-friendly
fashion.
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